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On 29 August 2007, Minister of Communications Suvi Lindén appointed a working group to 
examine the legislative amendments and other practical measures required to develop the use 
of radio frequencies available in the communications market. The working group’s term of 
office was from 1 September 2007 to 1 May 2008. 
 
Behind the establishment of the working group were measures prepared by the European 
Commission to increase the flexibility of frequency management and to commercialise 
frequency access rights. By the commercialisation of frequencies is meant the granting of 
access rights either by auction or by some other selection procedure in which the price 
payable for frequency access rights has the greatest influence on the selection. 
Commercialisation also encompasses the resale of access rights. 
 
The working group was assigned the task of examining the measures required to facilitate the 
commercialisation and other development of radio frequencies in Finland. According to the 
assignment, the report should include, among other things: 
 
• the practices of European Union member states in the commercialisation and other 
development of frequency access rights  
• its proposal for models for granting frequency access rights in Finland  
• the frequencies to be used in possible commercialisation  
• timetables by frequency band for the possible introduction of commercialisation  
• other limiting conditions for the possible commercialisation of frequencies  
• the roles of different ministries and agencies in the possible commercialisation of 
frequency access rights  
• the impact on annual fees for frequency access  
• a proposal on the use of revenue received from possible commercialisation  
• an estimate of the impact on revenue of possible commercialisation  
• other issues to be taken into consideration in the possible commercialisation of 
frequencies  
 
Communications Counsellor Juhapekka Ristola of the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications was appointed chairman of the working group, Counsellor Olli-Pekka 
Rantala of the Ministry of Transport and Communications as secretary, and Unit Manager 
Kirsi Karlamaa of the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority, Director Kari Koho of 
the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority, Senior Advisor Tero Kuitunen of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (Ministry of Labour and Industry), Assistant Director Timo 
Mattila of the Finnish Competition Authority, Deputy Director-General Kristiina Pietikäinen 
of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and Budget Counsellor Esko Tainio of the 
Ministry of Finance as members. In spring 2008, Ministerial Advisor Maaret Suomi of the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications also participated in the work of the working 
group. 
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The working group submitted its interim report to the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications on 27 November 2007. 
 
The working group met a total of 12 times during its work. The working group began its work 
in autumn 2007 with hearings of operators in the sector. A further hearing was arranged on 7 
March 2008. 
 
In accordance with the assignment, this final report presents a summary of the practices of EU 
countries in the commercialisation and development of frequencies as well as the working 
group’s proposal for the possible commercialisation of frequency access rights in Finland, 
including the necessary limiting conditions and an assessment of the legislative amendments 
needed. 
 
The working group itself does not take a stand on whether or not the proposals it presents 
should be taken into use. 
 
Having completed its work the working group respectfully submits its final report to the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications. 
 
 
Helsinki, 29 April 2008 
 
 
 Juhapekka Ristola 
    Working Group Chair 
 
 
                Kirsi Karlamaa       Kari Koho 
 
 
 
                  Tero Kuitinen    Timo Mattila 
 
 
 
                 Kristiina Pietikäinen        Esko Tainio 
 
 
 
 Olli-Pekka Rantala 
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Abbreviations used in the report: 
  
 
AIP 
CEPT 
FDD 
GSM-R 
ITU 
PPP 
TDD 
UMTS HSPA 
UMTS LTE 
WAPECS 
WiMax 
  
 
Administrative Incentive Price 
 
European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations 
Frequency Division Duplex 
Global System for Mobile Communications Railway International Telecommunications 
Union  
Purchasing Power Parity 
Time Division Duplex 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System High-Speed Downlink Packet Access   
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System / Long Term Evolution 
Wireless Access Policy for Electronic Communications  
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access 
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1.  Summary of the working group’s proposals 
 
In accordance with its assignment, the working group proposes possible market-based models 
for frequency management, which could be taken into use in Finland if desired. The working 
group’s proposals can be summarised as follows: 
 
• A market-based model for frequency management  could be applied in the frequency band 
2.50– 2.69 GHz, which will be liberated from other use at the beginning of 2009. The 
frequency band size is a total of 190 MHz and it could as matters stand be used to provide 
wireless broadband services. (more detail  in Chapter 7.1)  
 
• A possible timetable for starting the award of frequency access rights on a market basis 
could be the end of 2009. (more detail in Chapter 7.2)  
 
• Licences would be awarded following the principle of technology and service neutrality for 
the offering of electronic communications services. (more detail in Chapter 7.7)  
 
• A total of four network licences could be awarded in the frequency band, so that  
– three licences (two 2 x 25 MHz network and one 2 x 20 MHz network) would be best suited 
for frequency-division technologies (e.g. UMTS LTE) and  
– one licence (40 MHz) for time-division technologies (e.g. mobile WiMax).  
 
• The division would conform with both the CEPT recommendation on the use of this 
frequency band and the Europe Commission’s future harmonisation decision and it would 
allow a sufficiently large transmission capacity relative to the present third-generation 
networks. (more detail in Chapter 7.3) 
 
• At least one of the four licences would be awarded to an operator that does not currently 
hold an operating licence for a 3G mobile network. No more than one network licence could 
be received by the same operator. (more detail in Chapter 7.4)  
 
• Licences could be awarded either by auction or by beauty contest. An annual licence fee 
would apply for both models.  
 
1) In the auction model the operating licence fee would be paid annually in 
equal instalments, so that the size of one instalment would be the highest offer 
made in the auction divided by the length of the licence period. The advantage 
of the equal instalment model would be, among other things, that the high front-
loaded payments typical of auctions could be avoided.  
 
2) In the beauty contest model the operating licence fee would be a fixed annual 
licence fee (administrative incentive pricing).  
 
In both models, the normal frequency fees charged for radio licences would be 
paid in addition to the operating licence fee. (more detail in Chapter 7.5) 
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• Licences, with all rights and obligations attached to them, would as a rule be transferable 
either completely or partially. Although the transferability of licences would be the norm, 
transfers would require, however, the prior approval of the  
  
 
• Government, which could maintain the right not to accept a transfer for special reasons (e.g. 
competition issues, national security). (more detail in Chapter 7.6) 
 
• Licences would be national and valid for 15 years. (more detail in Chapter 7.8)  
 
• It would be imperative to attach conditions to the operating licences and radio licences in 
order to avoid  interference  and to ensure that obligations resulting from international 
agreements are taken into consideration. It would also be possible, if necessary, to amend 
these conditions without, for example, any liability for compensatory damages arising to the 
State. (more detail in Chapter 7.9)  
 
• The operating licence authority would be the Government, which would for example decide 
on the frequency bands to which the market-based model would be applied, award the 
licences and decide on their conditions, and could in exceptional cases and for special reasons 
decide not to accept the transfer of a licence. The Finnish Communications Regulatory 
Authority would, among other things, supervise adherence to the conditions of operating 
licences and radio licences, and determine the licence fees to be paid. (more detail in Chapter 
7.10)  
 
• An attempt can be made to assess the impacts of the introduction of a market-based 
management model on spectrum usage fees and State revenue on the basis of the frequency 
auction that took place in Norway in November 2007. By this comparison, the market value 
of the 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency band in Finland could be 25–34 million euros, in which case 
the fee for a single operating licence could be 412,000–570,000 euros per year. If a decision 
were taken to introduce a licence fee according to administrative incentive pricing, its size 
should reflect the assumed market value of the frequencies. (more detail in Chapter 7.11)  
 
• The working group makes no proposal on the use of the licence fees that may be collected 
by a market-based model. (more detail in Chapter 7.12)  
 
• The working group’s report presents an assessment of the legislative amendments required 
by the introduction of a market-based management model, chiefly in terms of the 
Communications Market Act and the Radio Act. (more detail in Chapter 7.13)  
 
• The working group itself does not take a stand on whether or not the proposals it presents 
should be taken into use.  
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Frequency Present model Possible market- Possible 
 
granting model (beauty contest) based model market-based 
 
  (auction) model (administra-
 
   tive incentive  
 
   pricing) 
 
Technology and service 
neutrality 
 
 
 
An attempt should be made to minimise 
conditions relating to the technology used 
and the service offered. 
 
 
Restrictions can be 
imposed on the 
technology used and 
the service offered.   
 
Operating licence award 
method 
 
 
 
 
 
Government awards 
licence based on 
beauty contest 
Government will 
award licence based 
on beauty contest 
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
  
Government will 
auction off licence to 
party that bids most 
(those participating in 
the auction must fulfil 
the conditions of 
Section 9 of the 
Communications 
Market Act).  
 
No licence fee 
 
Operating licence fee  
 
  
 
  
Annual licence fee, 
with level of fee 
determined by 
auction. 
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
Annual fixed licence 
fee determined by the
authority 
(administrative 
incentive pricing), 
with the level of the 
fee reflecting the 
market value of the 
frequencies. 
 
Frequency fee Administrative costs covered by frequency fee.  
 
Transferability of 
 
operating licence 
Transfer of operating 
licence is prohibited. 
Operating licence transferability would be 
the rule, if not prohibited for special reasons.
 
 
Operating licence 
conditions 
 
 
Restrictions necessary to avoid interference or to conform with 
international agreements can be imposed in operating licences and 
radio licences. 
 
15 years  
 
Licence period   
 
   
 
 
The Communications 
Market Act allows a 
licence period of 20 
years at most.   
 
 
 
Table 1. The working group’s key proposals for a possible market-based model for frequency 
management compared with the model currently in use. 
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2.  Organisation of working group’s work and hearings of operators 
in the sector 
 
The radio frequencies development working group started its work in autumn 2007 with 
extensive hearings in the sector. The working group heard, among others, telecommunications 
operators, mass communications operators, equipment manufacturers, other frequency users, 
and business and consumer representatives. Most of the parties heard considered at the time 
that possible commercialisation should not be directed at existing frequency access rights. 
 
In its interim report, the working group proposed that other current users of frequencies would 
be guaranteed undisturbed continuity in terms of valid access rights (official and research 
activity, television and radio, mobile communications and wireless broadband). In its interim 
report, the working group decided that, in accordance with the assignment, a process for the 
possible commercialisation of frequency access rights would be planned for frequency band 
2.50–2.69 GHz, which will be liberated from other use after 2008. The working group further 
decided in its interim report that the main principles of the planned commercialisation process 
would be the promotion of competition and new investments, the right to transfer access 
rights, and service and technology neutrality. The Europe Commission’s future 
recommendation relating to the granting of frequency access rights, the Wireless Access 
Policy for Electronic Communications Services (WAPECS), would be taken into account 
where applicable. 
 
During spring 2008, the working group decided to propose the possible frequency 
commercialisation models described in this report as well as limiting conditions relating to 
them. During its work, the working group updated the principles outlined in the interim 
report, so that: 
 
1) in the proposed models, money would act as a control mechanism in 
achieving the desired objectives and no fiscal targets would be set for money,  
2) the objective of the proposed models would be as good as possible 
communication services to users (price, quality, availability); other objectives 
would be to promote competition and as low as possible an entry threshold into 
the market, and to create opportunities for new services and technologies,  
3) the models would be built so that licences could be awarded for four parallel 
networks, and so that at least one licence would be awarded to a newcomer to 
the business, and that  
4) the final report would propose two alternative models, of which in one the 
granting of the first stage would take place by auction and in the other by a 
beauty contest.  
 
As part of its work during the spring, the working group examined  the practices and 
experiences of other EU countries in the commercialisation of frequencies, the technical 
limiting conditions relating to the commercialisation of frequencies, efficiency and 
competition aspects relating to commercialisation, as well as assessments of operators’ 
interest towards the chosen 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency band. On 7 March 2008, the working 
group held a hearing, which was attended by more than 30 representatives of key operators in 
the sector. The hearing discussed the approaches agreed by the working group in its interim 
report as well as preliminary approaches relating to the main principles of the 
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commercialisation models proposed in the final report. The hearing responded positively to 
the approach selected by the working group, particularly the choice of the 2.50–2.69 GHz 
frequency band. After the hearing, four written statements were delivered to the working 
group  (DNA Oy, Elisa Oyj, Erillisverkot Oy, SW Television Oy). Most of the written 
statements considered the present frequency management practices to be good and responded 
critically to auctions in particular. The Erillisverkot Oy statement considered it good that the 
decision has been made to leave official frequencies outside the possible market-based model, 
but the statement also requested that the frequency needs of the authorities be better take into 
consideration. 
 
Chapter 3 of this final report describes the practices of European Union member states in the 
commercialisation of frequency access rights. Chapter 4 assesses the technical limiting 
conditions of access rights to frequencies, taking into consideration, among other things, the 
principles of  technology and service neutrality. Chapter 5 examines efficiency and 
competition aspects of the commercialisation of frequency access rights. Chapter 6 evaluates 
factors relating to demand for the 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency band. The working group’s actual 
proposals for the possible commercialisation of frequencies are presented in Chapter 7. In 
addition, the working group’s proposals are summarised in Chapter 1. The proposals include 
all those elements called for in the working group’s letter of appointment. The proposals also 
include an assessment of the necessary legislative amendments, if it were decided to take the 
models into use. 
 
The working group’s interim report, which has not been separately issued as a Ministry of 
Transport and Communications publication, is attached in its entirety to this final report. 
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3. Practices of European Union member states in the 
commercialisation and other development of frequency access 
rights  
 
To ascertain the practices of European Union member states, the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications initiated a research project entitled “Models of Radio Frequency 
Commercialisation in EU Countries”. On the basis of a competitive tender, Nordic Adviser 
Group IT & Telecom Oy were selected to carry out the research project. The research was 
completed by 15 February 2008 and it has been published as Ministry of Transport and 
Communications publication 8/2008. The research (Finnish-language only) can be found in its 
entirety on the Ministry’s website www.mintc.fi/julkaisut. 
 
The research project was assigned the task of describing the commercialisation models 
applied in key EU member states. The project was particularly requested to explore: 
 
- how commercialisation has been implemented (description of 
commercialisation models),  
- the frequencies to which commercial models have been applied,  
- the conditions imposed for licences awarded on a commercial basis in respect 
of, for example, efficient use of frequencies, technical interference, cultural 
aspects and media diversity, duration of licences, coverage areas of licences, and 
transferability, lease and sharing of access rights,  
- the grounds on which access rights awarded on commercial terms have been 
priced and the nature of the experiences obtained about pricing  
- the impact on annual user fees for frequencies  
- how commercialisation has influenced the efficient use of frequencies  
- how commercialisation has influenced investments in wireless technologies  
- how commercialisation has influenced competition  
- what the roles of different authorities are in the commercialisation of 
frequency access rights  
- how large has been the revenue received from the commercialisation of access 
rights and what it has been used for.  
 
The research was executed partially through data gathering  and on summaries prepared on 
the basis of it, and partially on interviews with communications officials of selected EU 
countries (the UK, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands). 
 
The information presented and the terminology used in this chapter of the report is based 
mainly on the research conducted by the Nordic Adviser Group. 
 
 
Commercialisation v. market-based approach? 
 
The European Union is moving towards a market-based approach to radio frequency 
management. The general objective is to make more efficient use of the spectrum and 
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facilitate the introduction of new technologies. It is assumed that this will lead to increased 
competition and innovation, which will be further reflected in practice as new services and 
lower prices. Finland is one of the last western European countries in which a beauty contest 
based purely on official discretion is used to grant operating licences without significant fees. 
Other significant countries of western Europe, excluding Spain and France, use auctions in 
the granting of operating licences. 
 
Frequency commercialisation and market-based radio frequency management are defined to 
mean different things. According to the definition used by Nordic Adviser Group, frequency 
commercialisation means the granting of frequency access rights primarily based on the price 
paid (e.g. an auction or beauty contest in which the price paid is the key criterion for granting 
an operating licence). The market-based frequency management concept is wider and it means 
maximising  the efficiency of frequency use, for example by frequency commercialisation 
means. In some rare situations, these objectives may be in conflict, such as if some of the 
operating licences remain unsold at auction due to too high minimum prices or if the regulator 
favours operators whose frequency fees are linked to the companies’ success, thus restricting 
competition. 
 
In addition, market-based frequency management as a concept is considered to be wider than 
frequency commercialisation. Frequency commercialisation is considered to encompass the 
following options: 
 
• Auction  
• Beauty contest in which the price paid for an operating licence is one of the 
most important criteria (reminiscent of the normal comparison of tenders)  
• Beauty contest to which a continuous frequency fee clearly higher than 
administrative costs is connected  
 
Market-based frequency management is considered to include the following tools: 
 
• Frequency commercialisation (the above-mentioned three award methods)  
• Technology neutral operating licences  
• Service neutral operating licences  
• Administrative Incentive Pricing (AIP)  
• Tradable operating licences  
  
 
All of the above-mentioned commercialisation and market-based frequency management 
methods are termed market mechanisms. In the pursuit of more efficient use of frequencies, 
auctions are not the only mechanism. 
 
 
Commercialised frequencies and their purposes 
 
In the 1990s, a comparison procedure, i.e. beauty contest, was still the most used method in 
granting  competitive frequencies . For their operating licences, operators only paid an 
administration fee that covered the regulator’s costs. 
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A combination of beauty contests and higher frequency fees as well as, to an increasing 
extent, auctions have been applied since the turn of the millennium. Initially, market 
mechanisms were applied only in the case of those frequencies most in demand, but now the 
use of the mechanisms has also extended to official frequencies and in future may also extend 
to TV and radio frequencies. Currently Finland, alongside Portugal, is the last western 
European country in which a beauty contest based purely on official discretion is used to 
grant operating licences without significant fees. In fact, Portugal has already announced that 
it will use an auction to grant 3.5 GHz frequency band licences to be allocated during 2008. 
 
Countries that have pioneered the use of market-based models of frequency management have 
also utilised other market mechanisms in addition to auctions, such as tradability of licences 
and administrative incentive pricing (AIP). In Sweden, for example,  all frequencies are 
tradable, and in the UK AIP has been applied successfully also to the public sector. 
  
 
Figure 1. National licences awarded in significant European countries, by award method and 
technology (3G means third-generation telecommunications technologies utilising 
frequencies around the 2 GHz frequency band). Not included in the figure are Italy, Belgium 
and Switzerland, which have used the auction method throughout the whole period under 
examination. (Source: “Models of Radio Frequency Commercialisation in EU Countries”, 
Ministry of Transport and Communication publication 8/2008). 
 
 
Ways of implementing market-based models of frequency management 
 
Frequencies can be managed on market terms both at the licence award stage and at the usage 
stage. Traditionally the introduction of market mechanisms has focused on the award stage, 
when commercialisation could be implemented either by an auction or a beauty contest in 
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which the price paid by the applicant is included either as a threshold condition or as one 
selection criterion. 
 
Introducing market-based elements into frequency management  at the licence usage stage is 
possible by permitting the tradability of frequencies and, alongside this or alternatively, taking 
into use administrative incentive pricing (AIP). 
  
 
 
Figure 2. An auction is not the only market-based model of frequency management available 
to the regulator. Tradability and continuous frequency fees can also be taken into use during 
the term of the operating licence. (Source: Models of Radio Frequency Commercialisation in 
EU Countries, Ministry of Transport and Communication publication 8/2008). 
 
 
The auction method and the beauty contest are the most important methods of awarding 
desirable frequencies. An administrative decision in which a licence is given to the first 
applicant is applied only to less desirable and financially less significant frequencies. 
 
The beauty contest has many good features. The authority can implement its view of the 
public interest and control the development of the sector with rules and, furthermore, if the 
operating licence costs are kept low, this may have the effect of lowering prices for end-
customers. A beauty contest, however, is challenging to execute neutrally and transparently. 
Even if this is done successfully, the selection made and the criteria can always be criticised, 
and the decisions made can often be followed by lengthy appeal procedures. The traditional 
beauty contest cannot actually be considered to be a market mechanism, because the 
allocation of licences is the responsibility of a regulator not market forces. Market 
mechanisms that have an impact at the licence usage stage, such as administrative incentive 
pricing (AIP) or transferability, can however be added to an operating licence allocated 
through a beauty contest. These will be discussed later in this report. 
 
 14
The auction procedure is neutral and straightforward. The process is completely transparent 
when price alone decides. The auction procedure has its problems, however. It does not work 
properly if interest in low. Correspondingly, in a situation of overdemand, it can happen that 
the licence winner encounters a “winner’s curse” in the form of an excessive price, which 
might have an negative impact on investments, the scheduling of the start-up of services, and 
pricing. The auctioning of frequencies may also lead to a weakening of competition, with 
market leaders occupying frequencies only to prevent competition. This can be limited, 
however, with conditions and regulation. 
  
Between these two models is the beauty contest in which price in included as one important 
criterion. The procedure is therefore reminiscent of a normal comparison of offers, except that 
a high offer price is considered to be an advantage. Including price as one element facilitates 
the regulator’s burden of justification and might reduce any complaints made about the 
licences. At the same time, it moves the allocation of licences towards a market-based 
approach, while leaving some power of discretion with the regulator. 
 
During the term of the operating licence, licence holders can be charged frequency fees 
equivalent to the regulator’s costs, royalties higher than these, or an administrative incentive 
price (AIP). 
 
Covering the regulator’s costs is the most traditional model. The regulator’s costs are split 
among the licence holders and charged as annual fees. This model, however, does not 
necessarily encourage the efficient use of frequencies. 
 
Royalties are fees that operators pay as a share of the business revenue made possible by the 
licence, for example as a percentage of turnover or earnings. Royalties are a tax-like charge 
and they do not encourage the efficient use of frequencies. Moreover, earnings fluctuate, 
which might lead to problems if the fees are used to finance the regulator’s activities. 
Companies also strive to avoid fees as far as possible. Most problematic, however, is that the 
regulator’s neutrality is threatened if its funding is dependent on the operators’ earnings. 
 
A fee that follows the administrative incentive pricing (AIP) practice is an annual fee that is 
substantially higher than the administrative costs. Payment is dependent on the commercial 
value, size and generally also the geographical coverage of the frequency band being used. 
AIP sets for frequencies a cost that exceeds the regulator’s administrative costs, and it is a 
way of creating pressure for the efficient use and trading of frequencies in addition to the 
opportunity cost of merely using the frequencies. 
 
By applying AIP, the objective is to ensure that a powerful company in the market is not able, 
except at considerable cost, to collect frequencies and reserve them for itself. AIP can also 
help to shape the use of publicly funded operators’ frequencies in a more efficient direction, 
because AIP fees are real, budget-derived costs, not merely opportunity costs. 
 
In practice, an effort is made to determine the AIP fee by assessing the opportunity cost of 
each frequency band and its use. If, for example, a mobile phone frequency as well as the 
frequency next to it and its purpose are examined, the opportunity cost is found at the point 
where the benefit of transferring a frequency to mobile phone use corresponds to the loss 
experienced by the other purpose. Calculating the AIP fee in practice is very challenging, 
because assessing the effects and costs is difficult due to a lack of information. The AIP fee 
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should preferably be set too low rather than too high if the objective is to ensure that the fee is 
not excessively high and that companies are not burdened by an additional tax-like charge. On 
the other hand, if the AIP fee is set too low, then the desired control on the efficient use of 
frequencies will not be achieved. 
  
 
Operating licence conditions 
 
EU Directive (2002/20/EC) on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and 
services places restrictions on the imposition of the conditions set for spectrum accessibility. 
According to the Directive, only the following conditions can be set for operating licences: 
 
• The frequency purpose or network type/technology  
• Conditions relating to the efficient use of frequencies (e.g. coverage 
requirements)  
• Technical and operational conditions aimed at minimising the effects of 
interference and magnetic fields  
• The maximum duration of the authorisation  
• Conditions and restrictions relating to the transfer of access rights that takes 
place on the licence holder’s initiative  
• Usage fees  
• Other undertakings made by the licence holder during the selection process  
• Requirements relating to international agreements  
 
Comparing conditions of licences awarded by both auctions and beauty contests in a number 
of European countries shows that the award method simply has no impact on the number of 
conditions. Irrespective of the award method, regulators have therefore been able to set the 
conditions they wish within the framework of restrictions prescribed by the EU. 
 
In November 2007, the Europe Commission issued its proposal for amending the current 
electronic communications directives. In terms of licence conditions, the directive proposals 
would, when implemented, particularly affect restrictions relating to purpose and technology, 
with principles of technology and service neutrality becoming the norm, as well as to 
restrictions relating to transfer of access rights, with transferability being included as a key 
element in the new regulatory framework. 
 
Irrespective of the Commission’s proposals, the number of licence conditions in European 
Union member states has been declining in recent years – coverage and start-up scheduling 
requirements as well as technology and service requirements in particular are increasingly 
being abandoned completely. Licence tradability, moreover, is also more common. 
 
 
Tradability 
 
Spectrum tradability or transferability means that licence holders can if they wish sell or 
otherwise dispose of their licences / access rights to a third party. Efforts are currently being 
made to promote licence tradability in a number of European countries, because a secondary 
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market for licences is considered to enhance the efficient use of frequencies, create an 
opportunity cost for frequencies, and promote the more efficient allocation of frequencies. If, 
for example, a licence holder needs only part of the frequency it uses, it is to the holder’s 
advantage to sell the excess portion of the frequency to the buyer that will pay most, thus 
enhancing the use of the whole frequency band. In most European countries, the transfer of 
frequencies requires the advance approval of the licence authority. 
  
 
Licence award process 
 
Licence award processes vary from country to country, particularly in respect of the 
regulators who participate in the process and the market mechanisms used. Despite the 
differences, the licence process generally has the following stages: 
 
– Evaluation of supply. This can be done either actively or passively. A passive regulator 
waits for enquiries on the need for spectrum use from users and acts accordingly. An active 
role, on the other hand, requires a survey and evaluation of possibilities, based on which an 
attempt is made to direct supply to correspond with expected demand. NITA (Denmark) is an 
example of a passive regulator, while OFCOM (UK) can be considered an active regulator.  
 
– Evaluation of demand. The biggest challenge of regulators is, more often than not, the 
evaluation of demand for spectrum, because it is central in determining the ways in which 
spectrum licences can be awarded and therefore the opportunities to use market mechanisms 
in the said frequency band. It is impossible to evaluate demand completely reliably, because it 
depends on a number of uncertain factors, including technology development and timing, end-
customers’ needs, companies’ ability and willingness to invest and develop services, and the 
impact of possible competing technologies. Evaluating demand is particularly important, 
however, because it is only for frequency bands where demand clearly exceeds supply that it 
is worthwhile organising onerous competitive procedures, such as auctions, for example.  
 
– Planning of frequency division and terms. Although there is an increasing desire to set 
conditions on frequency use in a manner that is service and technology neutral, in practice the 
allocation of frequencies significantly influences the technologies that can be applied in the 
frequency band. In addition, when different technologies operate side by side, significant 
guard bands may be required to ensure that interference is minimised. In some cases, there are 
clearly some technologies that can be used in a certain  frequency band. Such a situation 
exists, for example, in the 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency band, which is suitable for both a 
UTMS- and a WiMax-based solution. The conditions attached to licences can be used to 
influence decisively the goals that can be achieved, for example in terms of increasing 
competition, service provision, innovations and other goals of the regulator. The absolute 
number of conditions applied to licences has declined in EU countries in recent years, as 
discussed above, and there is no perceptible difference in the number of licence conditions, 
irrespective of whether licences are awarded by auction or beauty contest.  
 
– Planning and selection of award method. The selection of the award method is based 
particularly on an evaluation of the demand, supply and potential purpose of the frequency. If 
demand for the frequency is low, an official decision to the award the frequency is, in 
practice, given quickly. If there is more demand than supply for the frequency band, the 
licence recipient is selected by a beauty contest or auction. Price planning of the award 
 17
method is  particularly important, because there are many kinds of award method, and most 
are suitable only for certain situations.  
 
– Awarding the licence. The award of the licence itself by beauty contest or auction is a rather 
fast and straightforward process, when preparations have been made with care. This stage 
typically lasts a few weeks. Nowadays auctions are often executed using computer 
programmes that enable dozens or even hundreds of operators to participate in the auction, 
which may last without a break for several days. Often the licence applicants must, at the 
application stage, give  information about their financial status and their background, for 
example in relation to national security. A similar process is followed in connection with 
licence trading. Regulators in the countries studied report, however, that where most 
frequencies are concerned national security is not a very significant issue. Certain radio 
frequencies, however, are also used by the defence forces, in which case the regulators may 
be more interested in any other parties who wish to operate on the same frequency band. 
 
– Supervision. The need for official supervision of licence conditions has reduced in recent 
years due, among other things, to the decline in the number of licence conditions and the EU’s 
policy of promoting competition. Naturally, regulators will still intervene in structures that 
prevent competition or distort market efficiency, to ensure that individual operators do not 
obtain a controlling market position. 
 
 
Roles of different operators 
 
Practices in the awarding of licences vary considerably from one EU country to another. Most 
typically, the national regulator participates in the awarding of licences in collaboration with 
the Ministry of Communications. The participation of industry in the sector is also common. 
In some countries, the award process might additionally involve the Ministry of Finance, the 
competition authority or some other ministry. 
 
The licence award process is considered to work most efficiently when responsibility for 
completing the process is clearly borne by one actor. The responsible authority listens during 
the process to industry and experts in the sector, but itself forms an overall view and is clearly 
responsible for advancing the process. Market mechanisms, such as auctions, licence 
tradability and administrative incentive prices transfer responsibility for tasks relating to the 
awarding and use of licences from the regulators to market forces, which underlines the 
regulator’s own activity in promoting competition. 
 
 
Use of revenue 
 
In connection with the revenue received from commercialisation, the 3G auctions of the turn 
of the millennium, which collected a total of more than 100 billion euros in Europe, come 
easily to mind. Three auctions alone, namely in Germany, the UK and Italy, collected a total 
of 99 billion euros, corresponding to 93 per cent of all revenue. The annual auction revenue in 
Europe currently totals only a few tens of million euros, i.e. less than one thousandth of the 
3G auction revenue. 
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Figure 3. Revenue received in licence auctions in Europe, including the first year’s revenue 
from the auction and other fees. (Source: Models of Radio Frequency Commercialisation in 
EU Countries, Ministry of Transport and Communication publication 8/2008). 
 
       
Figure 4. Revenue received in Europe by awarding licences (EUR/resident) 2000-2007. 
Relative revenues have varied markedly, depending on time, award method and technology. 
(Source: Models of Radio Frequency Commercialisation in EU Countries, Ministry of 
Transport and Communication publication 8/2008). 
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 It is probable that the auction results were inflated by the turn-of-the-millennium IT fever and 
that corresponding figures will not be seen again. 
 
Under the present practice, the EU countries use the money they collect from auctions for the 
state budget. There are, however, some exceptions in which revenue has been earmarked for 
the development of IT activity or frequencies. Examples of this can be found, for example, in 
Germany, France and Guatemala, but in the UK the allocation of money for a particular 
purpose is also possible, in principle. 
 
 
The impact of commercialisation on the efficiency of frequency use, investments, competition 
and consumer prices 
 
Frequency management objectives in different EU countries are very similar, irrespective of 
whether or not market mechanisms are used in frequency management. In recent years, the 
use of market mechanisms to promote these objectives has clearly increased, however. 
According to the authorities of countries that use market mechanisms, the objective of 
applying market mechanisms has not been mainly to collect money for the state; it has been to 
increase competition, improve the efficiency of the award process, ensure transparency and 
promote innovation and more effective technologies. 
 
The efficiency of frequency use must be evaluated more widely than by traditional methods 
that measure technical frequency efficiency (bits/MHz). The evaluation should take into 
account a number of factors, such as the scope and price of services, service need and service 
necessity. 
 
The authorities of countries that use market mechanisms consider that auctions have not 
reduced the efficiency of spectrum use in the countries in question. The regulators considered 
it good practice that an effort is made in connection with each auction to give a licence to at 
least one new operator. Increasing competition was considered to be a key factor in improving 
the efficiency of spectrum use. Administrative Incentive Pricing (AIP), moreover, was 
considered a good tool in improving the efficiency of use public operators’ frequencies. 
 
The significance for network investments of the auction prices paid for operating licences was 
actively discussed when the 3G auction wave was at its peak at the turn of the millennium. In 
the opinion of one school, large auction prices reduce investment, because after the auction 
the company’s financial status is weakened and the company does not necessarily have the 
capacity to make rapid investments, which will weaken the company’s financial situation 
further. On the other hand, it can be argued that willingness to invest is determined purely by 
a comparison of investment costs and expected yields, so investments made previously have 
no significance. If the 3G investments which have been made are examined, research 
indicates that no licence award method seems to have had a significant effect on network 
investments (see figure). 
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Figure 5. 3G investments made in Europe in relation to the number of licences awarded by 
auction and by official discretion. (Source: Models of Radio Frequency Commercialisation in 
EU Countries, Ministry of Transport and Communication publication 8/2008). 
 
Key criteria in evaluating the competitive situation are the number of competitors and 
particularly end-customer prices. An examination of 2G and 3G licences awarded by both 
beauty contest and auction in OECD countries indicates that auctions have been to some 
extent more successful in promoting competition (number of operators). An average of 1.14 
new operators were obtained for the 3G market by auction and an average of 0.67 by beauty 
contest. In addition, the absolute number of operators in a market was clearly greater in 
countries that used an auction as the licence award procedure. 
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Table 2. Numbers of GSM and 3G operators in different countries categorised according to 
3G licence award method. (Source: Models of Radio Frequency Commercialisation in EU 
Countries, Ministry of Transport and Communication publication 8/2008). 
 
In a comparison of end-user prices in OECD countries at purchasing power parity (PPP), an 
average mobile communications price basket in August 2006 was valued at 409 USD in 
countries that applied an auction process and 372 USD in countries that applied a beauty 
contest. The most expensive 3G licence fees were paid in Germany and in the UK, which 
even so are around the average in terms of price levels among OECD countries. Rather than 
the application of the auction process, end-user prices are influenced more by genuine 
competition in the market, which can be achieved by successful regulation , irrespective of the 
way the licences are awarded. For example, in northern European countries end-user prices 
have been inexpensive,  irrespective of the way that the frequencies were allocated. 
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Figure 6. Value of an average mobile communications price basket calculated by the OECD, 
by country in US dollars, August 2006. (Source: Models of Radio Frequency 
Commercialisation in EU Countries, Ministry of Transport and Communication publication 
8/2008). 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Value of an average mobile communications price basket calculated by the OECD, 
by country in US dollars, categorised according the 3G licence award method, August 2006. 
(Source: Models of Radio Frequency Commercialisation in EU Countries, Ministry of 
Transport and Communication publication 8/2008). 
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4. Technical limiting conditions, taking into consideration e.g. 
technology and service neutrality principles  
 
Conditions and restrictions of a technical nature set for users in current radio licences, 
particularly from the perspective of mobile communications frequencies 
 
The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) has awarded radio licences in 
accordance with a Government decree on the utilisation plan for frequency bands allocated to 
television and radio operations and licensed telecommunications activity as well as in 
accordance with the FICORA Frequency Regulation No. 4. The FICORA Frequency 
Regulation  No. 4 covers the frequency range 9 kHz – 400 GHz. In the utilisation plan, each 
frequency band is allocated to the use of certain types of radio systems. Each frequency band 
can typically be used for a number of different purposes. The sufficiently interference-free use 
required by the Radio Act (1015/2001) is as far as possible ensured in the utilisation plan by 
defining the technical criteria to be applied in the use of each radio system and by referring, 
according to need, to the applicable standards. Therefore in radio licence decisions there has 
been no need to define technical conditions and restrictions on use in comprehensive detail. 
 
In licence decisions it is, however, necessary to oblige network companies to adhere in border 
areas to obligations resulting from coordination agreements concluded with neighbouring 
states. These coordination agreements separately define the preferential channels usable in 
border areas. In certain cases it is also necessary to set power restrictions in order to protect 
use in neighbouring bands. For example, it is necessary to set restrictions on UTMS in the 900 
MHz band in order to protect GSM-R use in the adjacent band. 
 
 
The impact of technology neutrality on conditions and restrictions set for access rights 
 
A key point of departure and objective of the EU’s reformed frequency regulation is 
liberalising the purpose of frequency bands so that access rights are awarded in a technology 
and service neutral way, i.e. for the offering of electronic communications services. 
 
This means in practice that spectrum users can, as a rule, select the technology to be used 
themselves and decide on the kinds of electronic communications services they will offer. In 
terms of the conditions set for access rights, national room for manoeuvre may narrow 
through EU-level harmonisation. 
 
Technology and service neutrality in connection with commercialisation  could give rise to a 
situation in which a new licence holder wishes to change the technology previously used on a 
frequency to another, or changes the technical parameters of radio network base stations, for 
example transmitter locations, transmission powers or antenna characteristics. This could 
affect radio networks operating on adjacent or the same frequencies so that their operation is 
interfered with or traffic transmission capacity declines. 
  
Certain technical and non-technical (e.g. geographical) conditions necessary to safeguard 
sufficiently interference-free use may also be set for spectrum use. Ensuring that spectrum use 
does not cause unreasonable interference or disturbance to others using the same or adjacent 
frequency band when users change, would require that certain technical limiting conditions, 
binding on present and future users of the frequency band, be specified for operations. The 
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specification of technical conditions becomes significantly more challenging as frequency 
purpose and the technology used are liberalised. Authorities should have sufficiently wide 
powers in this field. Examples of technical conditions are spectrum mask criteria, power 
restrictions and interference levels, particularly on the boundaries of the licence area (in-band, 
out-of-band and areally specified restrictions). Correspondingly, it may be necessary in future 
to specify more precisely how much interference resulting from the use of a neighbouring 
band a spectrum user is obliged to tolerate. Despite the liberalisation of purpose, the above-
mentioned restrictions will also to some extent direct the purpose of frequency bands in 
future. 
 
The obligations arising from coordination agreements between states would also still be 
necessary. Moreover, it should be noted that it may be necessary to amend coordination 
agreements now and then, for example when the technology used in a certain frequency band 
changes or the number of network operators changes. 
 
To ensure interference-free communications, the authorities must have information on the 
technology that will be used in the radio networks as well as information on who has the right 
to use each frequency band. For this reason, frequency users would have an obligation to 
inform the authorities in advance about changes in the technology used and about any change 
in the holder of the access rights to the frequency band. In connection with changing the 
technology, it should be possible to change the technical conditions of the licence for reasons 
connected with ensuring interference-free operations. 
 
The interference situation as a whole would be more simply managed in connection with 
commercialisation of frequencies; the technical conditions of the licence would be binding as 
they are on the new holder of the access rights to a frequency, and they would change only if 
the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority approved an application to change them. 
 
To investigate cases of interference, it is necessary for the authorities to have information 
about all holders of access rights to frequency bands at any given time. 
 
 
Obligations resulting from international agreements 
 
The Radio Regulations of the ITU constitute the most important international agreement 
binding the spectrum decisions of states. The Radio Regulations are amended at the ITU 
Radio Conferences, which are held at 3-4 year intervals. As a result of changes made to the 
Radio Regulations, administrations may have to clear frequency bands of their old uses to 
make way for a new use that comes in their place or change the technical specifications of 
systems in a frequency band. This possibility should also be provided for in any market-based 
situation in which frequencies are managed on market terms. In matters of spectrum access, 
the possibility of taking into consideration frequency decisions of the European Commission 
that are binding on Finland should be continued. 
 
It should be possible to change conditions relating to spectrum if so required by international 
decisions that are binding on Finland. 
  
Finland has concluded coordination agreements on the use of different frequency bands with 
the spectrum administrations of neighbouring countries. These agreements specify the 
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procedures to be followed when frequency use affects the use of frequencies in a 
neighbouring country. The agreements also contain detailed frequency arrangements. To 
ability to honour obligations arising from coordination agreements must be maintained 
irrespective of how frequencies are managed. 
 
Individual frequencies have been coordinated with the spectrum administrations of both 
neighbouring and more distant countries. The authority of the country in whose territory a 
system or transmitter is to be taken into use and which might affect the radio communications 
of other countries or be affected by the radio communications of other countries sends to the 
countries in question a coordination request and gives details of the transmitter being taken 
into use to the administrations of the countries within its area of influence. If the transmitter 
being coordinated does not cause interference in the countries that receive a coordination 
request, it is approved. At the same time, the country approving the coordination assumes 
responsibility for ensuring that the coordinated transmitter or system receives interference 
protection from any transmitters that may be taken into use at a later date. A similar 
protection need covers transmitters that have been entered in the ITU International Frequency 
Register as a consequence of ITU notification and coordination procedures. 
 
The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority has received from and sent to other 
administrations many such coordination requests. It should be possible to manage changes to 
the technical specifications of radio transmitters so that no interference is caused by a foreign 
system that has received the approved frequency coordination. The same requirement 
naturally applies to a foreign country that has approved a coordination requested by the 
Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority. 
 
 
Ensuring that spectrum use is adequately free of interference 
 
The technology neutrality objective connected with commercialisation will reduce the 
detailed regulation of technical specifications in the present operating licence and radio 
licence procedure. This will significantly increase the risk of interference. That is why it is 
necessary for national authorities to be able to set the technical  restrictions relating to 
spectrum use that are necessary to ensure that radio communications are adequately free of 
interference . It should be possible to set restrictions nationally, because the use of adjacent  
frequency bands, for example, might differ in different countries. Similarly the same 
frequency band can be used for some completely different use in a neighbouring country (for 
example Russia), so avoiding interference should be planned on a case-by-case basis. 
 
National authorities should have adequate powers and means to continuously monitor that 
spectrum use is adequately free of interference in terms of those frequencies where operating 
licence transferability has been permitted. 
 
A new user of a frequency band should adhere to the technical restrictions that were imposed 
on the first user of the band to avoid radio interference. These restrictions are impossible to 
specify in advance on a general level for all radio networks and all frequency bands. They can 
be specified on case-by-case basis for each frequency band. In other respects, a new user of a 
frequency band could freely determine the technical specifications of its own network. It is 
necessary to impose geographical restrictions in the proximity of the national frontier or when 
network coverage has been geographical restricted. 
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In a situation where only part of a frequency band is transferred to another user, it should also 
be possible to set licence conditions relating to any guard bands that may be needed and other 
technical parameters that may be necessary to ensure that spectrum use is adequately free of 
interference. In such a situation it may be necessary to set conditions for both the transferor 
and the recipient of the frequencies. 
 
 
Fixed term of access rights 
 
It should be possible to re-examine the purposes of frequency bands  and, if necessary, change 
them. The need to change may follow, for example,  from harmonisation work in the 
European Union or the ITU. As a result, it would be necessary for the authority to award 
frequency access rights always for a fixed term to the first recipient of the frequencies. The 
fixed term would also be binding on any later holders of the access rights. 
 
 
Summary of technical limiting conditions 
 
- Technology neutrality could be applied in frequency bands managed on market 
terms, but not without restriction. In all cases, care should be taken to ensure 
that the radio frequency operating characteristics of the technology used are 
such that no interference arises to other frequency use and that use does not 
require unreasonable protection from other users outside the band. To ensure 
adequately interference-free radio communications, the authorities should have 
up-to-date information about the technology used and the network structure.  
 
- Restrictions imposed to avoid interference cannot be specified in advance for 
all radio networks and all frequency bands; they should be specified for each 
frequency band separately. It should be possible to change restrictions if this is 
necessary due to a change of the technology used.  
 
- To protect radio networks operating in the same frequency band from 
interference, technical restrictions may be tighter in the proximity of the national 
frontier or adjacent to the network operating area. For compatibility of 
neighbouring countries’ frequency use, it may be necessary to change national 
frequency access rights in frontier areas.  
 
- If the access right to a frequency band transfers to another user, this user 
should also adhere to the technical restrictions imposed on the first user to avoid 
interference. In other respects, frequency band users could freely determine the 
technical specifications of their own network.  
 
- Frequency access rights should always be awarded for a fixed term.  
 
- The EU and the ITU make decisions on frequency use that are binding on 
Finland. It should be possible to change national frequency access rights if so 
required by international obligations.  
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5. Efficiency and competition aspects of the commercialisation of 
frequency access rights  
 
Problems relating to the commercialisation of frequency access rights, in terms of the 
competitive situation and financial efficiency, might arise mainly in such exceptional 
situations where, due to technical reasons or licence conditions, only a narrow frequency band 
can be utilised in the offering of services. In such situations, the companies controlling the 
frequencies might have a business incentive to hold the frequencies without using them and 
thus prevent competition. 
 
Potential problems caused by a concentration of frequency control can probably be prevented 
by the technology and service neutral allocation of frequencies. If the same or sufficiently 
close substitute services can be freely offered on a number of frequency bands or utilising 
other distribution channels, it is less likely that problems will arise. 
 
If sufficiently flexible conditions are created for frequency transfers in the secondary market, 
it can be assumed that the likelihood of problems arising will be reduced. Centrally connected 
with this, moreover, is the creation of systems that encourage the transfer of frequencies when 
they are left unused. Accordingly, holding frequencies while not using them should be too 
expensive for those who hold them in relation to the benefit received from trading them. Such 
an incentive could be a continuous licence fee (for example based on an auction or 
administrative incentive pricing). 
 
Taking the above into consideration, it can be said that efficiency and competition problems 
which are connected with spectrum commercialisation and which threaten its success do not 
appear particularly probable, if the market-based model is planned and implemented with 
care. Planning and implementation of commercialisation should take into account, however, 
the possible disadvantageous effects that could arise, for example, from the concentration and 
hoarding of frequencies. This chapter has presented solutions through which these effects 
could be prevented in advance. It should also be noted that in a situation in which some of the 
frequencies have been allocated on market terms (as well as technology and service neutrally) 
and some by administrative procedures, particular consideration should be given to the 
efficiency of competition and the realisation of financial efficiency. If different principles are 
applied to different frequency bands in respect of frequency allocation, this might more 
probably have an impact on competitive conditions between companies. 
 
 
Inactive spectrum hoarding and speculation in access rights 
 
Frequencies ending up in the hands of major operators, and thus a concentration of the 
market, represent a threat associated with frequency commercialisation that should be 
prepared for, even though in those EU countries, for example, where market-based models of 
frequency management have been taken into use, threats of spectrum hoarding have not 
materialised . Unsupervised frequency commercialisation, however, could in principle 
facilitate spectrum hoarding or speculation in access rights. In such cases, market mechanisms 
would not result in the efficient use of frequencies. 
  
Hoarding a frequency band means purchasing and holding the access right to frequencies 
without utilising them in building a network. In such cases, operators purchasing access rights 
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would attempt to gain control in key market areas for their business as much spectrum as 
possible and perhaps leave this unused in order to prevent the entry of new operators into the 
market and an expansion of competition. A company that operates in this way assumes that 
the benefit of the market power achieved will exceed the benefits obtained from selling the 
frequency access rights. 
 
Another possible threat associated with frequency commercialisation is the use of frequency 
access rights as a speculative asset. The speculating company does not use the frequencies to 
develop a network; it purchases their access rights like financial instruments and waits for 
technology to develop and the value of the frequencies to grow in order to ultimately sell on 
the access rights. 
 
In order to prevent hoarding and speculation, frequency licence conditions should be made 
sufficiently incentivising. Holders of access rights should be bound, also when access rights 
are purchased from another company, to use the frequency band obtained within a period 
specified in advance or to give sufficient justification for not using the frequency band. 
Charging a sufficiently large annual licence fee and setting a time limit on spectrum access 
would reduce the risk of spectrum hoarding and speculation in access rights. 
 
 
Market concentration 
 
Frequencies in themselves do not constitute a communications market. Because frequencies 
are production factors that in a market-based model of frequency management have a market-
based price, the trading of access rights is actually the trading of assets. Spectrum trading 
might lead to the creation of a dominant market position (significant market power) in the 
electronic communications market, mainly in situations in which there are no alternative 
frequency bands or other distribution channels for offering a certain service. Unsuccessful 
operation of the spectrum market may thus also be channelled  into the electronic 
communications wholesale and end-product market that uses the frequencies. Unsupervised 
spectrum trading could cause a concentration of the market. This would prevent the increase 
in financial efficiency sought by permitting the transferability of frequency access rights. 
 
Frequency commercialisation could, in principle, lead to a market situation in which fewer 
companies than before have control not only of larger numbers of customers (market share) 
but also a bigger share of the spectrum. In such a case, smaller companies have less potential 
to expand their capacity and thus less incentive to increase their market share. Accordingly it 
is possible that a few large network companies will set, in a coordinated way1, an excessively 
high price for communications services, such that it would not be profitable for a small 
company to deviate from that price, because it would be unable at a reasonable investment 
cost to expand its operations and serve a greater number of end-customers. 
 
Market failures arising from frequency commercialisation could in principle be addressed 
using the advance regulation that already exists in the sector. Both general competition law 
and special regulation for the sector are applied in the electronic communications market. 
Through regulation, an attempt is made in advance to ensure that communications networks 
                                                 
1   A price set in a coordinated way does not mean a price agreed by an explicit agreement (=cartel), but tacit 
collusion in which the companies have no real competition pressures and they have natural incentives and 
opportunities to ‘divide the market’ and charge a monopolistic price. 
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and services are available to all telecommunications operators and users on reasonable terms. 
Through advance regulation, an attempt is made at the same time to prevent cases of misuse 
arising from a dominant position. A communications sector market regulated in advance 
must, however, fulfil certain advance criteria before the competitive situation of the said 
market can even be analysed and, if necessary, companies with significant market power in 
the said market can be regulated. As stated above, frequencies do not in themselves constitute 
a product market; they are production factors for communications services. Thus advance 
regulation based on the principles of competition law is not as such applicable to the 
prevention of the possible problems of frequency commercialisation. 
 
Misuse of market power can be addressed afterwards by general competition law. Regulation 
of company acquisitions is not directly applicable to spectrum trading. Under the provisions 
of the Act on Competition Restrictions relating to monitoring of company acquisitions, 
addressing spectrum concentration is possible in practice only when spectrum is transferred as 
part of an acquisition defined in the Act on Competition Restrictions (see Act on Competition 
Restrictions, Section 11). 
 
It would, however, be appropriate to be able to prevent market failures effectively in advance 
by monitoring spectrum trading. Under Article 9(4) of the framework directive on electronic 
communications, transfer of frequency access rights requires advance notification to the 
national regulatory authority responsible for spectrum assignments. National regulatory 
authorities must ensure that competition is not distorted as a result of any such transaction. 
The Finnish Communications Market Act currently has no corresponding provision. If 
transferability of frequency access rights were permitted, the said provision of the above 
article would become a part of national legislation. 
 
 
Summary of competition aspects 
 
- Unsupervised trading of frequency access rights could in some special 
situations lead to a concentration of both frequencies and the end-product 
market, which in turn could prevent the increase of financial efficiency sought 
by frequency trading.  
 
- To ensure efficient frequency trading, the terms of frequency access rights 
should be specified such that they are also binding on the recipients of the 
frequencies.  
 
- Charging an annual licence fee that seems adequate, flexible opportunities to 
transfer frequency access rights, and the setting of a time limit for frequency 
access rights would reduce the risk of inactive spectrum hoarding and 
speculation in frequency access rights.  
 
- Various market failures in the electronic communications market could in 
principle be addressed with regulations that already exists. General competition 
law is not, however, applicable to secondary trading of spectrum. Through 
special regulation of the electronic communications market, an attempt can be 
made to prevent cases of misuse of significant market power. Current advance 
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regulation is not, however, directly applicable to the supervision of problems 
that may possibly be related to frequency trading. 
 
 
6.  Interest in the 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency band in Finland 
 
For the successful completion of the licence allocation process, it is essential to be able to 
assess in advance the level of interest among market operators in the frequency band. To 
ascertain this, the Ministry of Transport and Communications has commissioned Nordic 
Adviser Group to conduct a study based mainly on interviews with Finnish 
telecommunications operators (Elisa, DNA Finland, TeliaSonera, Digita, Finnet, TDC Song, 
SuomiCom), potential foreign entrants into the market (Tele2, B2 Bredband, Telenor) and key 
equipment manufacturers (NokiaSiemens Networks, Ericsson, Alvarion/Daimler Finland). 
 
The assessments presented in this chapter are based to a large extent on the above-mentioned 
study. 
 
 
Maturing of technologies 
 
The 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency band would be best suited, as matters stand, for mobile  the 
WiMax and UMTS LTE technologies, which over time will converge and increasingly begin 
to resemble each other. The roots of mobile WiMax technology are internet technologies that 
can be characterised as inexpensive, local and simple in terms of their invoicing systems. The 
roots of UMTS LTE technology, on the other hand, are in telephone technologies, which in 
terms of starting point are more expensive, but which offer scale and are suitable for extensive 
networking. These are also characterised by technically demanding invoicing systems. In the 
maturing stage of the technologies, the frequency band could also be used for UMTS HSPA 
technology, which is a technology that is ready now. 
 
Currently, mobile WiMax is a time-division (TDD) technology and UMTS LTE is a 
frequency-division (FDD) technology, but it is possible that in future both technologies will 
be able to utilise both time- and frequency-division frequency usage. 
 
Equipment manufacturers estimate that the technologies will mature such that UMTS LTE 
networks and terminal devices could be available during 2009/2010, mobile WiMax networks 
and devices possibly a little earlier. It might be, however, that thereafter it will take 1-2 years 
before the technologies are mature for the mass market. 
 
The interest of operators will be influenced decisively by how the 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency 
band would be allocated to different operators as well as the size of the frequency segments 
for which licences would be granted. Both network and terminal equipment manufacturers as 
well as most telecommunications operators consider that Finland should adhere to the CEPT 
recommendation whereby the 2500–2570 MHz and 2620–2690 MHz frequencies would be 
reserved for frequency-division technologies and the 2570–2620 MHz frequencies for time-
division technologies. This would facilitate frequency coordination between countries and 
would bring economies of scale, which would promote the availability of inexpensive 
networks and terminal devices. 
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Telecommunications operators’ frequency needs 
 
According to the conducted survey, all the interviewed Finnish telecommunications operators 
consider the 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency band to be either very interesting or fairly interesting 
and expressed their intention to apply for a licence, although some only in the event of the 
licences being awarded by a beauty contest. The interest of present third-generation mobile 
communications operators is directed above all towards mobile services to be offered using 
the UMTS LTE technology. The interest of other domestic telecommunications operators is 
directed mainly towards mobile WiMax. Not one of the foreign operators showed interest in 
the frequency band and thus had no intention of applying for a licence. 
 
From the telecommunications operators’ perspective, a suitable time for the awarding of 
licences could be in 2009, when the technologies to be used could be mature enough for 
testing. The telecommunications operators estimate, however, it would be a further year or 
more after this until the start-up of commercial services. 
 
In the opinion of all the telecommunications operators interviewed, the most sensible option 
would be to award the licences nationally while perhaps including within this the option to 
transfer frequency access rights to some extent. 
 
The telecommunications operators consider it important that operating licences are awarded in 
sufficiently large frequency segments, which would we enable them to offer significantly 
higher speeds than the present third-generation mobile networks. In terms of frequency-
division licences, the general view is that a sufficient size would be 2 x 20 MHz per operating 
licence. In terms of a time-division frequency band, the minimum size is generally considered 
to be around 30 MHz. 
 
In terms of the duration of an operating licence, the telecommunications operators’ views vary 
from 10 to 20 years. Most consider a licence period of at least 15 years as desirable. 
 
Many operators responded sceptically to technology neutrality, because the necessary 
technical limiting conditions will, in practice, significantly restrict the choice of the available 
technology. Most considered service neutrality and transferability to be good. 
 
 
Licence award method 
 
The telecommunications operators interviewed in the conducted survey were asked their 
views on two theoretical market-based methods of awarding licences: an auction plus a 
normal frequency usage fee corresponding to administrative costs, and a beauty contest 
featuring an initial fee as well as a continuous fee higher than administrative costs 
(Administrative Incentive Pricing). Most operators interviewed considered the latter model to 
be the better of these alternatives. The auction model was supported by or responded to 
neutrally particularly by those telecommunications operators whose parent companies already 
had experiences of auctions in other countries. It was notable also that the interviewed foreign 
telecommunications operators considered the auction procedure to be transparent, and that 
they considered they would not apply for an operating licence in a country where the award 
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procedure was at the discretion of the national authorities. On the other hand, these 
telecommunications operators were not interested in the Finnish market as far as the 2.50–
2.69  
  
GHz frequency band is concerned, irrespective of what award method would be chosen for 
this band in Finland. 
 
 
Summary of frequency-band demand factors 
 
- The number of mobile data services is growing rapidly, which requires the 
introduction of a capacity band. Demand for the 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency band 
in Finland seems to be more than frequency capacity for the awarding of 
sensibly sized national operating licences, which supports the arrangement of a 
competition (either beauty contest or auction) for the frequencies.  
 
- Interest in the frequency band is above all domestic; there is no sign of 
possible interest from foreign operators.  
 
- Interest of present GSM and UMTS operating licence holders is directed 
particularly towards UMTS LTE technology, whereby the offered services 
would probably be an evolution of present mobile data services. Interest of 
potential new operators is directed more towards mobile WiMax, whereby the 
offered services could possibly also include various applications of small 
customer groups.  
 
- Potential users of the frequency band consider 2009 to be a suitable time for 
the award of operating licences.  
 
- Both telecommunications operators and equipment manufacturers are of the 
opinion that the frequency plan for the 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency band should be 
made in accordance with the CEPT recommendation. Frequencies should be 
awarded in sufficiently large segments, which would enable higher data transfer 
speeds than the present third-generation mobile networks.  
 
- Award national licences makes most sense.  
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7. Models proposed by the working group as a possible model for 
market-based frequency management in Finland  
 
 
7.1. Frequencies to be used in a possible market-based model  
 
The radio frequencies development working group concluded in its interim report that the 
proposed models for possible frequency commercialisation would be planned for the 2.50–
2.69 GHz frequency band. 
 
An advantage of the said frequency band is that the band will be released from use after 2008 
and the possible introduction of a new type of model for awarding frequencies in this band 
would not impact on present frequency users nor on existing frequency access rights. In this 
way, the public television and radio service as well as television and radio operations under 
Government-awarded software licences could be safeguarded, as could uninterrupted 
continuity for frequencies currently in mobile communications or wireless broadband use and 
in official and research activity according to existing frequency access rights. 
 
The frequency band size is a total of 190 MHz and with the present technology it could be 
used mainly for offering wireless broadband services (for example UMTS-LTE or mobile 
WiMax). 
 
 
7.2. Timetables for possible introduction of market-based model 
 
The selected 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency band will be released from radio link use at the 
beginning of 2009, which is therefore the earliest point from which new licences could be 
awarded in terms of spectrum availability. 
 
When assessing demand for the frequency band in question, it is probable that commercial 
operations would begin around 2010 at the earliest. One reason for this is particularly the 
development of the first technologies  that can extensively utilise the frequency band. 
Network and terminal equipment technologies based on the UMTS-LTE technology are 
expected to mature during 2009–2010. Technologies based on the mobile WiMax technology 
are expected to mature perhaps a little earlier. It is probable, however, that thereafter it will 
take 1-2 years before these technologies are mature for the mass market. From a demand 
perspective, it would be sensible to award frequency access rights at the stage when the 
above-mentioned technologies are ready for testing, i.e. in 2009 at the earliest. 
 
Awarding frequency access rights according to a market-based model would require 
legislative changes (more detail in Chapter 7.13). It can be assumed that a full year will go on 
preparation of the legislative proposals, parliamentary proceedings and the licence award 
process, in which case from an administrative perspective a realistic time for awarding 
frequency access rights on a market basis could be the end of 2009. 
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7.3. Frequency band allocation 
 
The working group proposes that commercialisation of the 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency band  
could be implemented such that the frequencies of the said frequency band are awarded in 
four segments. 
 
 
Figure 7. Working group proposal for the allocation of the 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency band 
between four operators. 
 
 
Frequencies 2500–2570 MHz (a total of 70 MHz) and 2620–2690 MHz (a total of 70 MHz) 
would be awarded as two 2 x 25 MHz frequency bands as well as one 2 x 20 MHz frequency 
band, and they would be best suited to frequency-division technologies (FDD). At least at the 
early stage of the licence period, the frequency-division technology could most probably be 
UMTS-LTE or at the very early stage possibly UMTS-HSPA, which is currently ready. 
 
The 2570–2620 MHz frequency band (less 5 MHz guard bands both sides), on the other hand, 
would be awarded as one actual 40 MHz segment and it would be best suited to a time-
division (TDD) technology. At the early stage of the licence period, such a technology could 
most probably be mobile WiMax. 
 
The proposed allocation would be in accordance with the CEPT recommendation on the 
frequency band and also, as matters stand, the Europe Commission harmonisation decision to 
be approved in summer 2008. The solution, which will be widely adopted in Europe, would 
ensure that reasonably priced terminal devices could be obtained for the Finnish market. It 
would also be easier to agree on the use of the frequencies with neighbouring countries if the 
pan-European recommendation is followed. 
 
The proposed allocation would also ensure that the frequency segments would remain 
sufficiently large (in terms of FDD at least 2 x 20 MHz, in terms of TDD at least 30 MHz), 
which would enable the offering of significantly faster wireless broadband services than at 
present and would make the frequency band attractive in comparison with the present UMTS 
frequencies, for example. 
 
 
7.4. Promoting competition 
 
When granting frequency access rights, in a competition (auction or beauty contest) a 
condition would be imposed such that at least one of the four operating licences would be  
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granted to an operator other than those who have an existing second- or third-generation 
mobile network licence in Finland. This would contribute to increasing competition in the 
frequency band. A corresponding model has been used in a number of European countries. 
 
Similarly, when granting licences a condition would be imposed that the same operator could 
receive only one of the four licences. 
 
 
7.5. Two alternative ways of awarding frequency access rights and 
determining the operating licence fee  
 
As stated in Chapter 6 above, demand directed at the 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency band is 
expected to be more than frequency capacity for the awarding of sensibly sized frequency 
segments. This supports the arrangement of a competition for the frequencies in question. 
 
The working group proposes two alternatives, with differing models of awarding frequency 
access rights: 
 
In Model 1 the Government would grant licences by auction to the operators who bid most. 
One operator could obtain one licence. The annual licence fee for each licence would be 
calculated such that the highest bid in the auction would be paid annually in equal 
instalments, with the size of one instalment being the sum bid in the auction divided by 15 
(length of licence period). The advantage of the instalment model would be, among other 
things, that this would avoid too large front-loaded fees during the technology maturing stage. 
 
In Model 2 the Government would award licences using a traditional comparison method 
(beauty contest) and as in Model 1 each operator could receive one licence at most. In this 
model, a fixed annual licence fee (administrative incentive price, AIP) would be attached to 
the licences. 
 
The size of the licence fees in respect of both models has been assessed in more detail in 
Chapter 7.11. 
 
In both models the applicants would pay an application fee in accordance with the 
Communications Market Act, the size of which according to the present law is 1,000 euros, 
but which could be reassessed in connection with other legislative amendments. As is 
presently the case under the Communications Market Act, a condition for granting an 
operating licence in both models would be sufficient financial resources as well as there being 
no proven grounds to suspect that the applicant will violate the provisions of 
telecommunications legislation. 
 
In both models, normal administrative frequency fees charged for radio licences would be 
paid in accordance with the decree of the Ministry of Transport and Communications on the 
fees collected by the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority for radio administrative 
services pursuant of the Act on Criteria for Charges Payable to the State (150/1992). 
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7.6. Transferability of operating licences 
 
In both models, operating licence holders could transfer (sell or lease, completely or partially) 
their licence to another operator. Operating licence conditions, and those of the radio licence 
connected with the operating licence, as well as the size of annual licence fee would remain 
the same in the event of a transfer. 
 
An intention to transfer a licence would have to be submitted in advance to the Government, 
which would have to approve the intention to transfer within two months before the transfer 
could be executed. 
 
The Government would, as a rule, have to approve the transfer if no special reason is evident 
as to why the transfer could not be approved. Such a special reason could relate, for example, 
to competition aspects or, on the other hand, national security, which the Government could 
assess by requesting, for example, statements on the intention to transfer the licence. If the 
Government decided in some individual case not to approve a licence transfer, no liability for 
compensatory damages would arise to the State from this. 
 
As stated in Chapter 5, frequency transfers could also be referred to the Finnish Competition 
Authority if frequencies are transferred as part of a company acquisition defined in the Act on 
Competition Restrictions. The transfer handling processes in the Government and the Finnish 
Competition Authority are separate, however, and parallel handling would not restrict the 
application of the provisions that are the basis of these processes. 
 
Operating licence holders could also return their licence to the licence authority before the 
end of the licence period. In the event of this, the licence holder would not need to pay the 
annual licence fee for the years after the return of the licence. The purpose of the return option 
would be to promote the transferability of licences also towards the end of the licence period, 
when the commercial value of a licence  – and thus the incentive to transfer it – would be low 
in the secondary market. 
 
 
7.7. Technology and service neutrality 
 
Licences would be granted following the principle of technology and service neutrality for the 
offering of electronic communications services. Most probably the frequencies of the 2.50–
2.69 GHz frequency band would be used to offer wireless broadband services requiring high 
capacity. 
 
An operating licence, moreover, would not require the use of any particular technology, even 
though, at least in the first stage of the licence period, the allocation presented by the working 
group in accordance with the CEPT recommendation and the future Europe Commission 
decision would lead to a situation in which the three licences planned for frequency-division 
technology (FDD) would be best suited to UMTS-LTE technology and the one planned for 
time-division technology (TDD) would be best suited for mobile WiMax technology. 
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Figure 8. Example of the impact of a technology change on the frequency capacity used by an 
operator. 
 
If an operating licence holder wished to change the technology it uses, for example from 
frequency-division to time-division, the necessary guard bands would be taken from the 
frequency capacity of the licence holder who changes technology (see figure). 
 
Any change of technology would have to be notified in advance to the Finnish 
Communications Regulatory Authority, which would assess whether the change would be 
implemented taking into account, for example, reasonable interference-free requirements. If a 
change of technology would adversely affect the operation or frequency capacity of other 
networks operating on the same or an adjacent  frequency band, the Finnish Communications 
Regulatory Authority could, within a reasonable time of receiving the notification and the 
necessary technical information, inform the licence holder that the change of technology 
cannot be implemented or that the change of technology would require changes to restrictions 
imposed in the radio licence. No liability for compensatory damages would arise to the State 
from any change of technical restrictions by the authorities. 
 
 
7.8. Duration of licence period 
 
In both models, the licence period would be 15 years, which can be considered a reasonable 
time to amortise the necessary investments. 
 
To ensure the efficiency of the secondary market for frequencies as well as the efficient use of 
frequencies, a decision on the continuation of the 15-year licence period proposed herein or 
on the other use of the frequencies after the licence period would have to be made at the 
earliest possible opportunity, and clearly before the end of the licence period. 
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7.9. Other market-based model limiting conditions 
 
Conditions relating to interference-free use 
 
Licence holders should be bound to adhere to certain technical and non-technical conditions  
whose purpose is to ensure that spectrum use is adequately free of interference. These 
conditions could be prescribed in the operating licence or the radio licence. Conditions 
relating to interference-free use could be, for example, spectrum mask criteria, power 
restrictions and interference levels, particularly at licence-area boundaries, as well as 
conditions relating to geography. Similarly there could be conditions in respect of how much 
interference resulting from use of adjacent frequencies a frequency user would be obliged to 
tolerate. 
 
 
Obligations arising from coordination agreements between states 
 
Operating licence and radio licences would in future, too, have to take into account 
obligations arising from coordination agreements between states as well as the need to amend 
the licences as a result of changes to such agreements . Similarly Europe Commission 
decisions on frequency harmonisation are binding on Finland as a member state of the 
European Union and such decisions may have an impact on the conditions of individual 
licences. No liability for compensatory damages would arise to the State from any alteration 
of licence restrictions arising from changes to international agreements. 
 
 
Technology neutrality limiting conditions 
 
Although licences would be granted technology neutrally, i.e. a licence would not expressly 
require the use of any particular technology, licence holders would have to notify the Finnish 
Communications Regulatory Authority in advance of their choice of the technology, and 
similarly if, during the licence period, they intend to change the technology they previously 
used on a frequency to another. This is necessary because a change can have an impact on the 
operation and transmission capacity of other networks operating on the same or an adjacent 
frequency band. 
 
If a change of technology would adversely affect the operation or frequency capacity of other 
networks operating on the same or an adjacent frequency band, the Finnish Communications 
Regulatory Authority could, within a reasonable time of receiving the notification, inform the 
licence holder that the change of technology cannot be implemented or that the change of 
technology would require changes to restrictions imposed in the operating licence. 
 
 
Obligation to start operations 
 
Operating licences would include an obligation to start operations. If the licence holder does 
now start its operations within a specified time, the licence authority could cancel the licence. 
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Licence area 
 
All four operating licences would be national, because in this way it will most probably be 
possible to avoid fragmentation of the frequency band in a manner that would be harmful to 
efficient use of the spectrum. 
 
Operating licence holders could, however, still transfer any free capacity they possess also 
partially (for example in terms of area, time or frequency band), provided that this does not 
cause harmful interference to other spectrum users and is in accordance with international 
coordination agreements . An obligation to negotiate on the sale/lease of unused capacity to 
other operators could be imposed in licences, if the licence holder does not itself use all the 
frequency capacity it possesses. 
  
 
 
7.10. Roles of different authorities in a market-based model of frequency 
management 
 
The licence authority would continue to be the Government, which would initiate the licence 
application process, award the licences and decide on licence conditions. The Government 
would approve a decree on a utilisation plan for frequency bands reserved for both television 
and radio operations and licensed telecommunications, in which would be confirmed those 
frequency bands to which a market-based model of frequency management could be applied. 
When it announced the application process, the Government would notify more detailed 
procedures relating to the licence award method. 
 
Although licence transferability would be the rule, licence holders would have to request the 
advance approval of the Government in respect of an intention to transfer a licence. The 
Government could request, if necessary, a statement from the Finnish Communications 
Regulatory Authority on technical limiting conditions relating to the transfer, and from  the 
Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority and the Finnish Competition Authority on 
competition aspects of the transfer. If a transfer were considered to have a possible impact on 
national security, the Government could request an opinion from the defence forces and the 
security police. If the Government decided for some special reason not to approve a licence 
transfer, no liability for compensatory damages would arise to the State from this. 
 
The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority would grant the radio licences connected 
with the operating licences. The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority would also 
supervise adherence to the conditions of operating licences and radio licences. The Finnish 
Communications Regulatory Authority could, on the application of the licence holder, 
approve a change of the technology used by the licence holder and impose the necessary 
technical restrictions for this. The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority would 
determine the licence fees payable. The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority 
together with the Finnish Competition Authority would supervise the implementation of 
competition in accordance with the present cooperation model and legislation. 
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7.11. Assessment of the impact of the possible introduction of market-
based model on annual fees for frequencies and State revenue 
 
In the auction model (Model 1), determination of the size of the licence fee would be more 
straightforward, because the size of the fee would be determined unambiguously in the 
auction. On the other hand, the precise estimation of the level of the licence fee in advance 
would not be possible, because the size of the fee would depend, among other things, on the 
number of interested companies and their willingness to pay. Most countries use an auction 
model in which the entire auction sum is paid in one instalment before the licence period 
begins. In comparison, the model proposed by the working group, in which the sum raised in 
the auction would be paid annually in equal instalments, would reduce the licence holders’ 
front-loaded payments in the maturing stage of the technologies. In the instalment model, it 
would also be possible to predict the impact on State revenue for many years ahead. 
 
In the beauty contest (Model 2), an annual licence fee of fixed size would be specified,  with 
its size being determined by the authorities, not by the frequency users. Accordingly, it would 
be possible to estimate in advance the impact of the model on annual fees for frequency use 
and on  
  
State revenue, at a stage when the size of the administrative incentive fee is being decided. 
Determining the correct level of the fee would be challenging, however, because it would 
have to reflect well the market value of the frequencies so that the desired incentive effect 
could be obtained with the fee. If a licence free determined on administrative grounds were 
set too low, the fee would not have the desired incentive effect on transferability. If, on the 
other hand, the fee were set too high, companies would be burdened by an excessive tax-like 
charge and the incentive effect would work in an unwanted way. In other countries (for 
example the UK) the AIP models in use have been applied to date only to frequencies used by 
the official bodies, so these models cannot be applied to frequencies of electronic 
communications services offered on commercial grounds. 
 
The frequency band market value, based on which the size of the licence fee in Model 1 
would be determined and reflecting which the licence fee in Model 2 would have to be 
determined, can be estimated using international examples. As the chapter of this report 
relating to the practices of other countries has discussed, the fees collected by frequency 
auctions have generally declined to a fraction of those paid in different countries’ 3G auctions 
in 2000. While, for example, 634 euros per inhabitant was spent on the UK’s 3G auctions in 
2000, the corresponding figure in Sweden’s 3.5 GHz auction in 2007 was only 0.05 euros per 
inhabitant. 
 
In terms of the 250–2.69 GHz frequency band, the best point of comparison may be Norway, 
where the 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency band was auctioned in November 2007 and where 
operating licences were granted for 15 years, as is also proposed in this report. In the 
Norwegian auctions, three operators paid a total of 25 million euros for their licences. 
Frequency values varied between 129,000 euros per MHz and 181,000 euros per MHz. 
Relative to population, a total of around six euros per inhabitant was paid for the licences. 
 
If the total sum paid in Norway is scaled in direct proportion to the Finnish population, the 
corresponding sum is around 30 million euros. By this formula, the annual licence fee of a 
single operating licence would be around 500,000 euros (4 network licences x 15 years x 
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500,000 euros = 30 million euros). An alternative estimate could be obtained by proportioning 
the licence fees paid in Norway for individual operating licences to the number of megahertz 
of the operating licences. In Norway the auction prices of single operating licences varied 
between 0.13 and 0.18 million euros per megahertz. Accordingly, the value of the 190 
megahertz frequency band could vary between 24.7 and 34.2 million euros and the level of a 
single licence fee would vary between 412,000 euros and 570,000 euros per year. 
 
In the comparison with Norway, it should be noted that the frequency allocation in the 
Norway auction was different from the frequency allocation proposed in this working group 
report. It can be assumed that the frequency allocation proposed in this report would be more 
attractive for the telecommunications operators, because in the allocation the frequencies 
would be granted in larger continuous segments. This would probably increase the 
companies’ willingness to pay, other conditions being the same. It should also be noted that 
the market-based awarding of operating licences in Finland could take place at the earliest 
two years after Norway. It is to be expected that interest in the frequency band will increase 
over time as the technologies mature and less expensive devices become available. On the 
other hand, in Finland most frequencies have been awarded by beauty contest without fees 
exceeding administrative costs, which could have the effect of reducing companies’ 
willingness to pay, particularly in the case of telecommunications operators who have existing 
frequency access rights in other frequency bands. 
  
Another nearby example of a country where a decision was made to auction the 2.50–2.69 
GHz frequency band is Sweden. The auction in Sweden began on 18 April 2008 and its 
results were announced around the time of publication of this report. 
 
 
7.12. Revenue received from the possible introduction of a market-based 
model 
 
The working group has discussed the use of the licence fees collected by a possible market-
based model. As the European comparison has revealed, the prevailing practice in other 
countries is the collection of spectrum fees for the State budget. There have also been some 
examples of the earmarking of licence fees e.g. for the development of IT operations or 
spectrum use. In terms of Finland, the working group has discussed the possibility of 
establishing a fund that could finance the provision of electronic communications services 
under a universal service obligation in areas where such activity is commercially unprofitable. 
The working group does not, however, make a proposal on the establishment of such a fund. 
 
The position of the Ministry of Finance is that revenue obtained from the commercialisation 
of frequencies is revenue remitted to the State budget and that it will not be earmarked or 
reserved to fund individual items of State expenditure. Revenue received from frequency 
sales will not increase the level of allocations under the Government’s overall spending limits. 
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7.13.    Legislative amendments required by the possible introduction of 
a market-based model of frequency management 
 
Act on Radio Frequencies and Telecommunications Equipment 
 
Chapter 1.2 of the working group’s interim report describes the existing national legislation, 
particularly in respect of the powers prescribed for the Finnish Communications Regulatory 
Authority in the Act on Radio Frequencies and Telecommunications Equipment (1015/2001, 
hereinafter the Radio Act). Under Section 6 Subsection 1 of the Radio Act, the Finnish 
Communications Regulatory Authority  shall prescribe the  use of frequencies for different 
purposes, taking into consideration  international decisions and recommendations. In the 
provisions, information shall be given on the purpose of each frequency band and on the main 
characteristics required of radio equipment using the frequency bands. Under Section 6 
Subsection 5 of the Radio Act, the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority shall act in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Transport and Communications when preparing these 
provisions. 
 
Under Section 7 Subsection 1 of the Radio Act, a licence shall be acquired for the possession 
and use of a radio transmitter, excluding such situations separately mentioned Subsections 2, 
3 or 5. Under Section 10 Subsection 1 of the Act, radio licences shall be awarded by the 
Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority. If the applicant aims to pursue 
telecommunications activities subject to licence referred to in Section 4 of the 
Communications Market Act (396/1997), no radio licence can be awarded unless the 
applicant has the appropriate licence granted by the Government. 
 
A frequency fee is charged for radio licences awarded by the Finnish Communications 
Regulatory Authority. The fees collected by the Finnish Communications Regulatory 
Authority for radio administrative services are prescribed by a decree of the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications (964/2005). The size of the frequency fee is determined on 
the basis of the usability and applicability of the radio licence frequencies. In addition, an 
effort should be made to enhance frequency use with the frequency fee. 
  
Under Section 6 Subsection 2 of the Radio Act, the Government shall confirm a utilisation 
plan for the frequency bands allocated to telecommunications activity requiring a licence 
referred to in Section 4 of the Communications Market Act (393/2003) as well as to television 
and radio operations subject to licence referred to in Section 7 of the Act on Television and 
Radio Operations. Under Section 6 Subsection 5 of the Radio Act, if a Finnish 
Communications Regulatory Authority order on the use of an individual frequency band may 
have a significant impact on the general development of the communications market, a 
utilisation plan for the frequency band in question shall be confirmed by the Government. 
 
 
Government decree on the utilisation plan for frequency bands allocated to television and 
radio operations as well as licensed telecommunications activity 
 
In June 2007, the Government issued a decree on the utilisation plan for frequency bands 
allocated to television and radio operations as well as licensed telecommunications activity 
(680/2007). The decree has provisions on the number of television, radio and mobile 
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networks, the frequency bands available for operations, and certain factors of a technical 
nature. The decree prescribes, among other things, the frequency bands available for second- 
and third-generation digital mobile communications as well as the frequency bands available 
for national digital broadband 450 MHz mobile network operations. The decree additionally 
prescribes the number of networks in use for each activity. Appended to the decree is a 
detailed listing of the frequencies available for different television and radio operations 
(utilisation plan). 
 
 
Communications Market Act 
 
Chapter 2 of the Communications Market Act has provisions on practising 
telecommunications. Under Section 4 of the Act, a licence is required to provide a network 
service that uses radio frequencies in a digital terrestrial mass communications network or in a 
mobile network practising public telecommunications. Under Section 5 of the 
Communications Market Act, an announcement shall be made that a licence is available for 
application when frequencies that are technically appropriate as well as appropriate for the 
efficient use of frequencies become available for telecommunications subject to a licence. The 
availability of a licence for application is announced by the Government in accordance with 
the frequency band utilisation plan referred to in Section 6 of the Radio Act. Under Section 7 
of the Act, a licence applicant is obliged to pay to the State an application fee of 1,000 euros 
for the application. The aim of the fee is mainly to prevent baseless and mischievous 
applications. 
 
Licences are awarded by the Government for a fixed period of up to 20 years. 
 
The requirements for the award of a licence are prescribed in Section 9 of the 
Communications Market Act. A licence shall be awarded if the applicant has sufficient 
financial resources to meet the network operator obligations, and the licence authority has no 
justifiable reason to suspect that the applicant will violate the provisions of this Act, the Radio 
Act, the Act on the Protection of Privacy in Electronic Communications or any other 
telecommunications act. The Communications Market Act requires that if a licence  cannot be 
awarded to all applicants due to a scarcity of radio frequencies, it shall be granted to 
applicants whose operation best promotes the objectives prescribed in Section 1 of the Act. 
  
Under Section 1 of the Communications Market Act, the objectives of the Act are to promote 
the provision and use of services within communications networks and to ensure that 
communications networks and communications services are available under reasonable 
conditions to all telecommunications operators and users throughout the country. A further 
objective of the Act is to ensure that the opportunities available for telecommunications in 
Finland accord with the reasonable needs of users and that the opportunities are competitive, 
technologically advanced, of high quality, reliable, safe and inexpensive. 
 
Section 10 of the Communications Market Act prescribes the content of a licence. The 
geographical operating area of the licence holder shall be specified in the licence. Conditions 
promoting the objectives of the Act as well as network or service quality requirements may be 
incorporated into a licence. In addition, conditions supplementing the technical orders of the 
Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority referred to in the Act concerning the technical 
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characteristics of communications networks or the efficient use of frequencies may be 
incorporated into a licence. 
 
Under Section 11 of the Act, a licence may be amended during its period of validity with the 
consent of the licence holder or otherwise if this is necessary for special reasons due to 
technical development or an essential change in the operating conditions of an activity subject 
to licence. Section 12 of the Act contains provisions on the cancellation or transfer of a 
licence. The Government may cancel the licence of a telecommunications operator in part or 
in full, if the telecommunications operator has repeatedly and seriously violated the 
provisions of the Act or the licence conditions, or the telecommunications operator no longer 
has sufficient financial resources to meet its obligations in view of the nature and extent of the 
operation, and if the telecommunications operator, despite being requested to do so, fails to 
rectify its conduct or replenish its financial resources to a sufficient level. 
 
Under Section 12 Subsection 2 of the Communications Market Act, a licence is non-
transferable. The Government may cancel a licence if effective control in respect of the 
licence holder changes. Any such change shall be notified immediately to the Government, 
who shall decide on whether to cancel the licence within two months of the notification. 
Under Section 12 Subsection 3, the internal transfer of a licence within a group between the 
parent company and a wholly owned subsidiary is not considered to be a licence transfer that 
would require cancellation. Such a transfer shall be notified immediately to the licensing 
authority. 
 
Under Section 15 a of the Communications Market Act, a telecommunications operator 
subject to notification or licence shall pay an annual communications market fee to the 
Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority. The fee covers the costs incurred to the 
Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority for carrying out the duties provided in the 
Communications Market Act in respect of telecommunications operators. 
 
Legislative amendments required by the possible introduction of market-based models of 
frequency management 
 
The possible introduction of commercialisation models for frequency access rights proposed 
by the working group would require amendments to existing legislation. In connection with 
possible national legislative amendments, it will also be necessary to take into account the 
Commission’s proposed changes to electronic communications directives currently being 
processed by EU bodies as well as other preparation of acts impacting on frequency 
management under way in the  
  
EU, and international orders and recommendations relating to the use of radio frequencies that 
are binding on Finland. 
 
An efficient and fast execution of the licence award process would require, as a preparatory 
first-stage action, the evaluation of supply and demand, which would not require changes to 
existing legislation. Moreover, planning of frequency allocation and conditions can be carried 
out without amending existing legislation. The selection of the licence award method and the 
licence award procedure itself, on the other hand, will require changes to legislation if there is 
a desire to introduce alternative models of awarding licences alongside the present beauty 
contest model. Introducing new models of awarding licences would not require changes to 
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regulations relating to the official supervision of licences, except for the insertion of Article 
9(4) of the framework directive  on electronic communication into the Communications 
Market Act. The framework directive requires the national body responsible for frequencies to 
ensure that transfers of frequency access rights do not result in a distortion of competition. 
The Communications Market Act currently has no corresponding provision. 
 
The working group proposes that, in order to promote competition, when frequency access 
rights are awarded a condition would be imposed such that at least one of the four operating 
licences would be awarded to an operator other than those who have an existing second- or 
third-generation mobile network licence in Finland. In addition, a condition would be 
imposed that the same operator could receive only one of the four licences. Applicants could 
be notified of these conditions when the licence application process is initiated, and a need to 
amend legislation would not arise. 
 
 
Model 1 
 
Communications Market Act 
 
Model 1, where licences would be awarded to the party bidding most in an auction, would 
require the addition to the Communications Market Act of provisions on the possibility of 
awarding fixed-term access rights to certain frequencies using an auction. The matter could be 
enacted by adding a new subsection to Section 4 of the Act stating that a licence can be 
awarded by an auction in addition to the traditional beauty contest. 
 
A new Subsection 3 would have to be added to Section 8 of the Communications Market Act 
8 giving more detailed provisions on the auction procedure. 
 
If the model were taken into use, a provision on the payment of the auction fee would have to 
be added to the Communications Market Act. Under the working group’s proposal, the 
licence holder would pay an annual licence fee. To the Communications Market Act would 
therefore be added a new Section 12 a, by which a telecommunications operator to whom a 
licence had been awarded by auction for frequency bands separately specified in the decree 
referred in Section 6 of the Radio Act would be obliged to pay an annual licence fee. The 
annual instalment would be the auction price paid by the telecommunications operator divided 
by the length of the licence period. The fee would be determined by the Finnish 
Communications Regulatory Authority. To the Section 12 a would also have to be added 
provisions on the charging the fee, on appealing Finnish Communications Regulatory 
Authority decisions on the determination of the fee, and on situations in which a licence 
holder has transferred a licence to another operator or returned a licence to the licence 
authority. 
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Model 2 
 
Communications Market Act 
 
Model 2, in which licences would be awarded following the existing Government licensing 
procedure and at the same time an annual licence fee obligation incorporated into the licences, 
would require amendments to the Communications Market Act. 
 
If the model were taken into use, a provision on the payment of an administrative incentive 
fee (licence fee) would have to be added to the Communications Market Act. Under the 
working group’s proposal, the licence holder would pay an annual licence fee. To the 
Communications Market Act would therefore be added a new Section 12 a, by which a 
telecommunications operator, to whom a licence had been awarded pursuant of Section 8 of 
the Communications Market Act and for frequency bands separately specified in the decree 
referred in Section 6 of the Radio Act, would be obliged to pay an annual licence fee of fixed 
size. The fee would be determined by the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority. To 
the Section 12 a would also have to be added provisions on the charging the fee, on appealing 
Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority decisions on the determination of the fee, and 
on situations in which a licence holder has transferred a licence to another operator or 
returned a licence to the licence authority. 
 
 
Other legislative amendments applicable to both commercialisation models 
 
Communications Market Act 
 
Under Section 5 of the Communications Market Act, the Government would initiate the 
licence application process. If frequency access rights were awarded following the market-
based  procedures proposed by the working group, new provisions relating to this would have 
to be added to Section 5 of the Act. To Section 4 would therefore have to be added a new 
Subsection 3, by which the Government, when initiating the licence application, would have 
to state which model of awarding licences award will be applied, and the procedures relating 
to the award method to be used, such as, for example, auction conditions as well as provisions 
relating to any possible preliminary evaluation. In terms of the latter, the working group 
proposes that licence applicants should at the first stage provide information on their financial 
situation and background, when award procedures according to commercialisation models are 
used. 
 
The limiting conditions of the possible commercialisation of frequencies have been outlined 
above. In so far as Section 10 of the Communications Market Act would not enable the 
inclusion of such conditions in the licence regulations, the Communications Market Act 
would have to be supplemented. 
 
The working group proposes that a licence holder could transfer a licence it had been awarded 
to another operator. Under Section 12 Subsection 2 of the Communications Market Act, a 
licence is non-transferable. The prohibition on transferring a licence would still cover licences 
awarded by a traditional beauty contest. If commercialisation models were introduced, to 
Section 12 of the Communications Market Act would have to be added a new subsection 
containing provisions allowing the transfer of a licence awarded on market terms as 
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separately mentioned in the decree on the utilisation plan for frequency bands allocated to 
television and radio operations as well as licensed telecommunications activity. To Section 12 
would also have to be added a provision on the telecommunications operator’s obligation to 
notify the Government of its intention to transfer a licence it had been awarded to another 
operator, in situations where transferability would be permitted. The Government would have 
to approve an intention to transfer before its execution. If necessary, the Government could 
request a report from the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority on technical limiting 
conditions relating to the transfer that are needed, for example, to ensure that radio 
communications are adequately free of interference, and from  the Finnish Communications 
Regulatory Authority and the Finnish Competition Authority on the transfer’s impact on 
competition in the communications market. Licence holders would also have to notify any 
possible change of the technology used, which would require the advance consent of the 
Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority. 
 
The Communications Market Act does not contain provisions on a licence holder’s obligation 
to begin activity in accordance with the licence awarded. In practice, a condition by which a 
licence holder is obliged to maintain activity in accordance with a licence has been added to 
operating licences awarded under Section 8 of the Government Act. The working group 
proposes for consideration that the Communications Market Act be amended in this respect 
such that an obligation to begin operations within a fixed period would be imposed on the 
licence holder. The obligation would also have to cover cases in which the holder of a licence 
awarded on market terms has transferred the licence to another operator. 
 
 
Government decree on the utilisation plan for frequency bands allocated to television and 
radio operations as well as to licensed telecommunications activity 
 
The frequencies covered by any market-based model of awarding licences frequency 
management could be confirmed in a Government decree on a utilisation plan for frequency 
bands reserved for both television and radio operations and licensed telecommunications. To 
the decree would therefore have to be added a provision according to which the 2.50–2.69 
GHz frequency band could be used for the provision of electronic communications services. 
The provision would be service and technology neutral. 
 
 
Radio Act 
 
The radio licence regulations of the Radio Act will facilitate in ensuring that frequency use is 
adequately free of interference also in cases where frequency access rights have been awarded 
on market terms. Under Section 11 of the Radio Act, for example, a radio licence  may be 
transferred from one company to another within a consolidated corporation referred to in the 
Companies Act (734/1978). The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority must be 
informed of the transfer immediately. A radio licence can be transferred other than within a 
consolidated corporation only if the licence conditions contain such a provision. If an 
operating licence awarded by Government has been awarded on market terms, the Finnish 
Communications Regulatory Authority could incorporate a condition whereby the licence 
may be transferred to another operator. The view of the working group, however, is that an 
amendment to Section 11 of the Radio Act should also be considered in this respect. 
 
 48
The above proposal should not be considered exhaustive. If it should be decided to implement 
the working group’s proposals for frequency commercialisation, the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications would immediately initiate a project necessary for the preparation of a 
Government proposal. 
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8.  APPENDIX 1: Working Group Interim Report 
 
Radio Frequencies Development Working Group 
Interim Report 27 November 2007 
  
 
 
 
To the Ministry of Transport and Communications 
 
 
On 29 August 2007, Minister of Communications Suvi Lindén appointed a working group to 
examine the legislative amendments and other practical measures required to develop the use 
of radio frequencies available in the communications market. The working group’s term of 
office is from 1 September 2007 to 1 May 2008. 
 
Behind the establishment of the working group were measures prepared by the European 
Commission to increase the flexibility of frequency management and commercialise 
frequency access rights. By the commercialisation of frequencies is meant the granting of 
access rights either by auction or by some other selection procedure, in which the price 
payable for frequency access rights has the greatest influence on the selection, as well as the 
resale of access rights. 
 
The working group was given the task of examining the measures required to facilitate the 
commercialisation and other development of radio frequencies in Finland. According to the 
assignment, the report should include, among other things: 
- practices of European Union member states in the commercialisation and other development 
of frequency access rights  
- its proposal for models for granting frequency access rights in Finland  
- the frequencies to be used in possible commercialisation  
- timetables by frequency band for possible introduction of commercialisation  
- other limiting conditions for the possible commercialisation of frequencies  
- the roles of different ministries and agencies in the possible commercialisation of frequency 
access rights  
- the effects on annual fees for frequency access  
- a proposal on the use of the revenue received from possible commercialisation  
- an estimate of the impact of possible commercialisation on revenue  
- other issues to be taken into consideration in the possible commercialisation of frequencies  
 
Communications Counsellor Juhapekka Ristola of the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications was appointed chairman of the working group, Counsellor Olli-Pekka 
Rantala of the Ministry of Transport and Communications as secretary, and Unit Manager 
Kirsi Karlamaa of the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority, Director Kari Koho of 
the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority, Senior Advisor Tero Kuitunen of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (Ministry of Labour and Industry), Assistant Director Timo 
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Mattila of the Finnish Competition Authority, Deputy Director-General Kristiina Pietikäinen 
of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, and Budget Counsellor Esko Tainio of the 
Ministry of Finance as members. 
 
The working group was requested to submit an interim report by 1 December 2007 and 
a final report by 1 May 2008. 
  
Before the submission of this interim report, the working group met six times and, among 
other things, heard a wide range of operators in the sector. This interim report presents a 
review of the current situation of international and EU-level provisions on spectrum access, a 
summary of sector hearings, the frequency bands that may have potential and/or capacity to 
come within the sphere of possible commercialisation, and principles for restricting the 
working group’s work, in view of the final report to be presented by 1 May 2008. 
 
The working group takes no position on whether or not the models proposed  during the 
working group’s continuation work should be taken into use. The Government decides 
on frequency operating licences. 
 
Having completed the first stage of its work, the working group respectfully submits its 
interim report to the Ministry of Transport and Communications. 
 
 
Helsinki, 27 November 2007 
 
 
 
Juhapekka Ristola 
Working Group Chair 
 
 
Kirsi Karlamaa Kari Koho 
 
 
 
Tero Kuitinen Timo Mattila 
 
 
 
Kristiina Pietikäinen Esko Tainio 
 
 
 
Olli-Pekka Rantala 
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1.  General about frequencies 
 
 
 
 
Radio frequencies are a limited natural resource that has a considerable  social and economic 
significance. Radio frequencies are used for various purposes, including mobile 
communications and official networks, wireless broadband networks, wireless local area 
networks, mass communications networks, radio links (used by e.g. telecommunications 
operators, power companies, authorities), satellite traffic, private radio networks, maritime 
radio traffic, aviation radio traffic, amateur radio traffic and environmental remote sensing 
and monitoring. 
 
Although frequencies are limited, they are not, however, consumed, nor do they decline in 
use. Many factors influence the usability of radio frequencies. A radio transmitter affects 
other radio devices within its coverage area. The effect is greater the closer the devices are in 
terms of frequency and geographical distance. If the interaction is sufficiently powerful, it 
may be evident as adverse interference, a decline in transmission capacity or a weakening of 
transmission quality. The characteristics of radio frequencies set limitations on their 
utilisation. The higher the frequency at which transmission takes place, the more difficult and 
expensive it becomes to manufacture radio devices. The propagation characteristics of radio 
waves also make the use of high frequencies difficult for most purposes. An estimated 95 per 
cent of radio devices subject to licence currently operate in Finland on frequencies below 10 
GHz, and 99 per cent on frequencies below 25 GHz. When radio transmitters exempt from 
licensing  are taken into consideration, more than 99 per cent of all radio devices are 
estimated to operate on frequencies below 10 GHz. 
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A practical example of the better usability of low frequencies is that around 60% fewer base 
stations are needed for building continuous coverage for a 3G mobile network in the 900 
MHz frequency band than in the 2100 MHz 3G frequency band. 
 
Frequency planning work for new radio systems is increasingly demanding because there are 
no unused frequencies below 25 GHz, and planning work is focusing more and more on 
compatibility of frequency use of different radio systems. The introduction of licence-exempt 
devices and the growth in the number of devices in many different applications is increasing 
the need for resources and frequency planning. They also require continuous development of 
frequency management. 
 
Frequency management can be arranged in number of different ways. The alternatives 
include, for example, granting exclusive rights to frequencies through administrative 
decisions, a beauty contest or on a commercial basis, or by permitting frequency sharing. 
Alternative management methods may be used, and are used, often in parallel. In accordance 
with its assignment, the working group has focused in this interim report on evaluating the 
possible commercialisation of frequencies. When considering  the possible commercialisation 
of frequencies, it is necessary to assess, on the one hand, the mechanisms of possible 
commercialisation and also, on the other hand, the wider impact of commercialisation on 
service provision and use and, ultimately, economic growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Current regulatory situation and future outlook 
 
2.1 National legislation 
 
The objective of the Communications Market Act (393/2003) is to promote the provision and 
use of services within communications networks and to ensure that communications networks 
and communications services are available under reasonable conditions to all 
telecommunications operators and users throughout the country. Under Section 4 of the 
Communications Market Act, a licence is required to provide a network service that uses 
radio frequencies in a terrestrial mass communications network or in a mobile network 
practising public telecommunications. 
 
Impact on economic growth of services that use 
frequencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Service sales turnover 
 
 
 
 
Service provision and use 
 
 Commercialisation of frequencies 
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The purpose of the Act on Radio Frequencies and Telecommunications Equipment 
(1015/2001, hereinafter the Radio Act) is to promote efficient, appropriate and sufficiently 
interference-free use of radio frequencies, to safeguard the fair availability of radio 
frequencies, to create conditions that maximise the unrestricted mobility of radio equipment, 
and to promote efficiency in the public telecommunications market. 
 
Under Section 6 of the Radio Act, the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority shall 
decide on the allocation of frequency bands for certain purposes as well as on the allocation of 
the available frequencies between users, duly taking into consideration international decisions 
and recommendations on radio frequency use. Similarly under Section 6 of the Radio Act, the 
Government shall confirm a more detailed utilisation plan for radio frequencies allocated to 
television and sound broadcasting as well as to telecommunications subject to licence. The 
Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority shall act in cooperation with the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications when preparing these decisions. If a decision on the use of an 
individual frequency band may have a significant impact on the general development of the 
communications market, a utilisation plan for the frequency band in question shall be 
confirmed by the Government. Pursuant of Section 6 of the Radio Act, the Finnish 
Communications Regulatory Authority has issued a radio frequency order (4/2006) and 
Government a decree (680/2007). 
 
The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority awards access rights in a radio licence 
granted under Section 7 Subsection 1 of the Radio Act. Under Section 10 Subsection 7 of the 
Radio Act, if a licence  can be awarded only to some of the applicants due to a scarcity of 
radio frequencies, it shall be granted to applicants whose operation best promotes the purpose 
of the Radio Act, namely to promote efficient, appropriate and sufficiently interference-free 
use of radio frequencies, to safeguard the fair availability of radio frequencies, to create 
conditions that maximise the unrestricted mobility of radio equipment, and to promote 
efficiency in the public telecommunications market. 
 
Under Section 8 Subsection 1 of the Radio Act the Finnish Communications Regulatory 
Authority may incorporate in a radio licence conditions necessary to ensure efficient and 
appropriate use of radio frequencies, efficiency of the communication market and prevention 
or removal of interference in radio communications. 
 
Under Section 7 of the Radio Act, the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority may 
issue, in respect of the licence, orders relating to free use as well as orders on the acceptance 
in Finland of a licence (or other access right) granted by an administration of another country. 
Under Section 8 of the Radio Act, the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority has also 
issued general orders on conditions necessary to ensure the prevention or removal of 
interference. 
  
 
2.2 EU Draft Recommendation on Frequencies (WAPECS) 
 
Under Article 19 of the framework directive on electronic communications, the European 
Commission is preparing a recommendation, within the regulatory framework for electronic 
communications, on conditions that will be incorporated into the Wireless Access Policy for 
Electronic Communications (WAPECS). The Commission will issue the recommendation 
after hearing the Communications Committee. The recommendation has been under 
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preparation in various Commission committees and subworking groups for over a year and it 
is expected to enter into effect in early 2008. 
 
Based on a draft (COCOM07-33, 15 June 2007), which has been considered by the 
Communications Committee, it can be stated that the recommendation would cover non-
technical conditions relating to radio frequency access rights and it would be applied to access 
rights awarded or renewed after the recommendation enters into effect. The recommendation 
would cover television frequencies  (UHF band, 470-862 MHz), frequencies reserved for 
second- and third-generation mobile communications (880–915 MHz, 925–960 MHz, 1710–
1785 MHz, 1805–1880 MHz, 1900–1980 MHz, 2010–2025 MHz, 2110–2170 MHz) as well 
as the 2500–2690 MHz and 3.4–3.8 GHz frequency bands. 
 
Under the draft recommendation, conditions to be incorporated into frequency access rights 
should be uniform in terms of end-user access, irrespective of frequency band. The number of 
conditions would be restricted to a minimum to ensure that use is as flexible and efficient as 
possible. As a rule, the service for which the said frequencies should be used would not be 
specified in the access rights, unless so required by an objective serving the general good. The 
member states would as far as possible allow market forces to decide the most efficient use of 
frequencies and thus permit the transfer of access rights from their original holder. The 
introduction of other market-based approaches will also be recommended. The specification 
of geographical coverage requirements would also be possible in future, but procedures would 
be open in terms of non-compliance with requirements. Access rights awarded would be as 
long as possible in terms of their duration, so that market forces would have time to influence 
the identification of an efficient purpose for the frequencies. 
 
The recommendation would not directly obligate the member states, but under Article 19 of 
the framework directive the regulatory authorities of the member states would have to take the 
greatest possible account of the recommendation and in the event that it were decided not to 
comply with the recommendation, the national regulatory authority would have to notify the 
Commission of this and justify its position. In Finland, complying with the WAPECS 
recommendation would require amendments to national legislation on frequency access 
rights. 
 
 
2.3 Proposals for electronic communications directives (in terms of frequencies) 
 
On 13 November 2007, the Commission submitted to the European Parliament and Council 
proposals for amendments to electronic communications directives as well as a regulation for 
the establishment of a European Electronic Communications Market Authority. The approval 
of the proposal requires the approval of both the Union’s legislative bodies according to the 
codecision procedure. It is expected that the codecision procedure will take at least around  
  
1 1/2 years, after which the member states will have 1–2 years to amend their national 
legislation to conform with the directive. When implemented, the proposals would have a 
significant impact on the management and use of radio frequencies. 
 
Under the Commission’s proposals, separate licences would be discontinued in frequency 
management unless the awarding of individual access rights is necessary to prevent adverse 
interference or is required by an objective serving the general good. As a rule, the principles 
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of technology and service neutrality would be applied in frequency management. 
Accordingly, frequency access rights would not as a rule be linked to a certain technology or 
to the provision of a certain service. Exceptions to the rule would be possible, but they should 
be applied only on a limited basis and they should be justified by an objective serving the 
general good. 
 
Under the proposals, the reselling of frequencies would be permitted in certain specified 
frequency bands. The proposals do not specify, however, what these frequency bands would 
be like; this would be decided separately in a comitology procedure. In connection with the 
directive proposals, however, the Commission also issued a communication on the use of the 
digital dividend, namely what should be done with the frequencies liberated from use by 
analogue  television channels. In its communication, the Commission proposes that the UHF 
frequency band would be divided into sub-bands, such that the lowest band would continue to 
be used for TV services, and their use would be coordinated nationally. The central part of the 
spectrum would also be coordinated nationally, but would include voluntary EU coordination. 
According to the Commission, these frequencies could be used for various mobile multimedia 
services. The upper frequency band would be coordinated flexibly on the EU level, e.g. for 
offering fixed and mobile broadband services. The Commission communication has no 
binding legal effect. 
 
Under the directive proposals, the Commission would also be given the right to coordinate 
and harmonise frequency access rights, selection procedures and selection of companies in the 
case of the above-mentioned pan-European frequency bands being involved. In this the 
Commission would be assisted by the European Communications Market Authority, which is 
to be established. 
 
 
2.4 Radio Regulations of the ITU 
 
The Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) constitute an 
international agreement binding the spectrum decisions of member states. The Radio 
Regulations are amended at the ITU’s World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRC), held 
every 3-4 years, which discuss the  allocation of frequency bands for different purposes. As a 
result of changes made to the Radio Regulations, administrations may have to clear frequency 
bands of their old uses to make way for a new use that comes in their place or change the 
technical specifications of systems in a frequency band. 
 
European joint positions and initiatives for the WRC are prepared within the sphere of the 
Conference of European Post and Telecommunications (CEPT). The Finnish 
Communications Regulatory Authority regularly participates in the preparations that takes 
place in CEPT. Within the sphere of CEPT, a number of recommendations relating to 
spectrum use have also been made which Finland is generally committed to follow. 
  
 
2.5 Other EU countries’ practices on radio frequency commercialisation 
 
In connection with the work of the working group currently under way, the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications has initiated a research project “Models of Radio Frequency 
Commercialisation in EU countries”. On the basis of a competitive tender, Nordic Adviser 
 56
Group IT & Telecom Oy were selected to carry out the research project. The intention is to 
complete the research project by 15 February 2008 and its results will be utilised in the 
working group’s final report. 
 
The research project was assigned the task of examining the practices of European Union 
member states in the commercialisation and other development of frequency access rights as 
well as the experiences obtained with them. 
 
The research should describe in detail the commercialisation models in use in the EU member 
states in question. The research should reveal in particular, 
 
- how commercialisation has been implemented (description of 
commercialisation models)  
- the frequencies to which commercial models have been applied  
- the nature of the terms and conditions imposed for licences granted on a 
commercial basis in respect of, for example, efficient use of frequencies, 
technical interference, cultural aspects and media diversity, duration of licences, 
area coverage of licences, and transferability, lease and sharing of access rights  
- the grounds on which access rights granted on commercial terms have been 
priced and the nature of the experiences obtained about pricing  
- the impact on annual user fees for frequencies  
- how commercialisation has influenced the efficient use of frequencies  
- how commercialisation has influenced investments in wireless technologies  
- how commercialisation has influenced competition  
- what the roles of different authorities are in the commercialisation of access 
rights to frequencies  
- how large has been the revenue received from the commercialisation of access 
rights and what it has been used for.  
 
 
 
 
3.  Sector hearings 
 
3.1 Organisation of the hearings 
 
The Spectrum Development Working Group arranged extensive hearings for sector operators 
and user groups on 21 and 28 September 2007. Those heard by the working group were: 
 
Kari Risberg and Seppo Nieminen, Digita Oy,  
Riitta Tiuraniemi and Anna Tsakirakis, DNA Finland Oy,  
Jorma Miettinen, MTV Oy, 
Jukka Tuomaala, The Finnish Maritime Administration,  
Caspar Berntzen, C More Entertainment Oy,  
Tapio Karjalainen and Pertti Vepsäläinen, Elisa Corporation,  
Rose-Marie Skogster, Telemast Nordic Oy,  
Rauno Ruismäki, Nokia Corporation, 
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Leena Ryynänen, Pro Radio Oy,  
Mari Österberg, The Finnish Consumer Agency, 
Raimo Lehto, Michael Fletcher and  
Jukka Heikinheimo, The Finnish Amateur Radio League, 
Asko Huuskonen, The Finnish Meteorological Institute,  
Kimmo Urhonen, The Finnish Civil Aviation Authority,  
Olli-Pekka Heinonen, The Finnish Broadcasting Company,  
Jukka-Pekka Joensuu, TDC Song Oy,  
Reijo Svento and Marko Lahtinen, Ficom ry, 
Kimmo Manni and Yrjö Pylvänäinen, Finland Erillisverkot Oy,  
Ritva Partanen, Savonlinnan Puhelin Oy, 
Jouko Seitakari, Defence Command Finland,  
Antti Räisänen, Helsinki University of Technology,  
Teemu Summanen, Finnet Assocation, 
Tapani Pökkä, Timo Hietalahti and Tapio Haapanen, Teliasonera Finland Oyj,  
Janne Holopainen, Digi TV Plus Oy, 
Harri Kujala, Turun Paikallisradio Oy,  
Nils Rostedt, Oy L M Ericsson Ab,  
Veijo Turunen, The Confederation of Finnish Industries,  
Antti Pakkala, NRJ Finland Oy and 
Markku Lamminluoto and Anne Nuutinen, SW Television Oy. 
 
A period of 15 minutes was reserved for each of the parties heard: 10 minutes for a prepared 
presentation and 5 minutes for more detailed questions from the members of the working 
group. 
 
The parties heard had been requested to deliver a PowerPoint presentation of at most three 
slides, with which the working group members had an opportunity to acquaint themselves in 
advance. The written material received in the hearings is publicly available on the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications website (www.mintc.fi). 
 
 
3.2 Summary of the views presented 
 
Mass communications operators 
Mass communications operators were particularly critical in their response to possible 
commercialisation of spectrum use. In this group, only one operator, a newcomer to the 
sector, considered that the commercial allocation of frequencies also had possibilities. All of 
the other television and radio companies heard as well as companies providing mass 
communications network and payment card services considered that frequencies intended for 
television and radio broadcasting should not be commercialised. Spectrum fees were 
considered to weaken operators’ financial operating potential. The Finnish Broadcasting 
Company also emphasised its public service role, which is safeguarded in a supplementary 
protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam and within whose sphere, in its view, the frequencies 
used in public radio broadcasting belong. Companies for whose business pay-television 
operations have a big significance considered that the possible commercialisation of 
frequencies needed by terrestrial television networks also represented a competition problem 
in relation to cable and satellite television. A number of television operators also considered 
that the UHF frequencies liberated from analogue television should continue to be reserved 
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for the use of television services. The frequencies needed for high-definition television were 
particularly used as justifications. According to different estimates, high-definition 
transmissions could begin in the terrestrial television network in the period 2008– 2010. Some 
of the mass communications operators considered that the criteria for awarding licences for 
frequency access should clarified. 
  
Telecommunications operators 
Some telecommunications operators considered that frequencies should not be 
commercialised. The justifications presented included the fact that the efficient use of 
frequencies would not be promoted by commercialisation. In addition, a threat was thought to 
be presented by possible spectrum hoarding, which it was believed would impact particularly 
on the operating potential of small operators and operators of small member states. Those 
who respond critically to commercialisation consider that commercialisation will lead to a rise 
in customer prices as well as to a reduction in willingness to invest. One company also 
highlighted possible problems at the Russia interface in the commercialisation of frequencies. 
The telecommunications operators in question considered that if spectrum use were 
commercialised , the frequencies currently in mobile communications use should be 
safeguarded for the period of validity of the licences and that the present frequencies 
allocation model should be preserved alongside any new one. They further emphasised that 
sensible operating conditions for operators of different sizes should be safeguarded in any 
possible commercialisation. 
 
Some of the telecommunications operators already had experiences of spectrum 
commercialisation from other countries in which the groups behind them had business 
operations. These companies did not consider spectrum commercialisation to be 
fundamentally problematic, and they also saw opportunities in commercialisation. One such 
telecommunications operator considered that commercialisation could particularly be of 
benefit to television companies in the form of inexpensive  distribution paths. According to 
one other telecommunications operator, important factors in possible spectrum 
commercialisation would be the safeguarding and predictability of investments made as well 
as a sufficiently long transition period and carefully prepared details. One telecommunications 
operator emphasised efficiency and openness as well as the importance of good frequency 
planning in commercialisation. Companies within this group considered that 
commercialisation would not necessarily reduce regulation; regulation would also be needed 
after commercialisation. 
 
The association representing communications sector and telecommunications operators 
responded critically to commercialisation, but assumed that, due to the development of the 
EU, a move towards commercialisation in some form would take place nevertheless. 
Accordingly, the focus should above all be on minimising adverse factors, for example 
commercialisation should not lead to concentration nor hoarding and, in conditions of 
commercialisation, companies’ investment capacity should be maintained and the amount of 
regulation kept at reasonable level. 
 
Equipment manufacturers 
The equipment manufacturers at the hearings considered the present model of frequency 
management to be for the most part effective. One company stressed that the present model 
based on harmonisation of spectrum use has been open and transparent, and that it has 
brought with it economy of scale and sufficient business potential. The company in question 
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did not envisage problems with technology neutrality, provided that it did not give rise to 
technical interference. Neither equipment manufacturer had a position on commercialisation, 
but both emphasised that they will not support large front-loaded spectrum usage fees. 
 
Other spectrum users 
A common view of parties representing other uses for frequencies (shipping, aviation, 
meteorology, amateur radio activity, defence, official networks, spectrum research) was that 
they considered that the frequencies they need should not in any circumstances be 
commercialised  nor must possible commercialisation elsewhere be allowed to disturb these 
public utility uses. In addition, Defence Command Finland highlighted the fact that the needs 
of national defence in emergency conditions must be safeguarded in the event of possible 
commercialisation. 
  
Use of fees receivable from possible commercialisation 
Some of the parties heard have a view on the use of the spectrum fees receivable from 
possible commercialisation. Possible uses proposed included development and innovation of 
wireless services in Finland, maintenance and development of national frequency 
management, radio technology education, development of critical infrastructure development, 
lowering of other spectrum fees, and support for diversity in public broadcasting. 
 
 
 
4. Frequency bands with potential and/or capacity to be included in possible 
commercialisation 
 
4.1 Fixed access network systems: 3500 MHz WiMax 
 
The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority has been awarding radio licences for 
fixed wireless access network radio systems since the end of the 1990s. A 180 MHz-wide 
frequency band 3410–3600 MHz, divided into three paired bands  a) 3410–3438 MHz/3510–
3538 MHz, b) 3438–3466 MHz/3538–3566 MHz and c) 3466–3490 MHz/3566–3590 MHz, 
has been allocated to these systems in Finland. In size, the frequencies segments are: a) 2 x 28 
MHz, b) 2 x 28 MHz and c) 2 x 24 MHz. Nearly all use WiMax technology. On the other 
hand, manufacturer-specific older generation products, which are not mutually compatible, 
are also still in use. 
 
Most of the existing valid radio licences were awarded during 2006. There are around 50 
valid radio licences. All radio licences have been granted on a regional basis, but certain 
companies have a valid radio licence  for a number of geographical  areas. Radio licences 
have been awarded, as a rule, for five years at a time – but such that most of them are valid 
until 31 December 2010. The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority is currently 
awarding new radio licences such that they are valid until 31 December 2010 at the latest. 
 
Most of the licence holders have begun providing telecommunications services at least in 
some of the coverage areas specified in the technical licence conditions. 
 
The most common reason for a delay in the start-up of operations has been slow progress in 
the technical standardisation of WiMax devices. This has led to a situation in which operators 
have to commit to one equipment manufacturer’s products, which is not economically 
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sensible in the longer term. Different generation WiMax devices are not interoperable, which 
means that the investment in base stations must be repeated if some newer technology is 
adopted. On the other hand, some of the operators have already adopted a newer technology 
in which there is partial support for mobility, yet still relying on the products of only one 
manufacturer. The situation is quickly changing, however, as the WiMax Forum has begun 
certifying equipment for compatibility. Currently, certificates have been awarded for the 
products of more than 30 equipment manufacturers. 
  
Exclusion areas between WiMax networks 
The use of WiMax technology for fixed connections requires an exclusion area between radio 
networks to prevent interference . In the radio networks, providing a service in the exclusion 
areas is completely prohibited. In many cases, radio licence holders have, however, agreed on 
the use of an exclusion area that is smaller than normal. At the same time, operators have to 
commit to cooperate in the planning of their radio networks, so that interference can be 
minimised. Agreement on the reduction of exclusion areas between different operators has 
reached on many occasions (around 90). Through these agreements, it has been possible to 
reduce the 40 km exclusion or even remove it completely between the radio networks of 
different operators. This has significantly promoted the efficient use of radio frequencies. 
 
Coverage areas have been specified in radio licences either by base station or by larger unit of 
area (municipality, region or otherwise specified area). 
 
Mobile WiMax 
The term mobile WiMax is included in standard IEEE 802.16–2005 (802.16e),which 
addresses the characteristics of mobile use, namely radio interface requirements when moving 
in interior and exterior spaces as well as the functions, including channel and cell switching, 
necessary to manage mobility. 
 
The development of mobile WiMax technology has been assigned to a number of frequency 
bands, of which the 3400–3600 MHz and 2500–2690 MHz frequency bands can currently be 
allocated for use in Finland. 
 
The mobile WiMax technology differs from fixed WiMax in that it uses a time-division 
duplex (TDD), in which the same frequency channel is used for transmission and reception. 
Fixed WiMax uses a frequency-division duplex (FDD), whereby transmission and reception 
channels use carrier waves of different frequencies (the same way as in GSM). Present radio 
licences have been awarded based on frequency-division use. The present three licences per 
geographical area does not hold true for mobile WiMax; in theory, more licences per area can 
be awarded for it. 
 
The introduction of mobile WiMax technology would facilitate several parallel networks in 
the same geographical area and would promote the efficient use of frequencies. 
 
A number of the present licence holders of fixed access network radio systems have still not 
begun the building of a network, because they are awaiting the development of mobile 
WiMax equipment and the preparation of standards. In the 3466–3490 MHz/3566–3590 MHz 
frequency band, mobile WiMax would possibly be affected by restrictions due to present 
radio link use. Radio link use is currently coordinated with fixed access networks such that no 
interference is caused for these systems. 
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Usability of 3.5 GHz frequency band 
The use of frequencies for fixed access network radio systems is fragmented, because radio 
licences have been awarded regionally according to demand. There is currently no uniform 
national frequency segmentation or one covering larger geographical areas. The restructuring 
of frequencies could be reassessed  for the period after 31 December 2010. 
 
 
4.2 2500–2690 MHz frequency band 
 
The World Radiocommunication Conference WRC allocated additional frequencies to IMT-
2000/UMTS systems in 2000. According to the 2002 CEPT frequency decision, the 2500–
2690 MHz band was also allocated to the IMT2000/UMTS mobile networks 
(ERC/DEC(0206)) from 2008, if there is a national need for this. A European decision 
(ECC/DEC/(05)05) was also made in 2005 for the harmonised introduction of 
IMT2000/UMTS. 
 
Based on the utilisation plan for this harmonised mobile traffic, the 2500–2690 MHz 
frequency band will be reserved for other than radio link use after 2008. In Finland there are 
currently around 500 radio links still in use in the frequency band. The radio link licence 
holders have been informed about the change of the utilisation plan, and the removal of radio 
links from this band can be done gradually according to the frequency needs of the new 
networks. A frequency band is available in the 190 MHz band. 
 
The harmonised frequency decision specifies frequencies 2500–2570 MHz and 2620–2690 
MHz for use as paired frequencies (FDD technology) and frequencies 2570–2620 MHz as 
unpaired frequencies (TDD technology). In FDD, namely frequency-division duplexing, the 
transmission and reception channels use carrier waves of different frequencies. In TDD, 
namely time-division duplexing, the same frequency channel is used for transmission and 
reception. Third-generation UMTS technology uses FDD technology, as does the present 
WiMax technology in the 3500 MHz frequency band, which is based on the fixed location of 
the terminal device. Mobile WiMax, on the other hand, is based on TDD technology. 
 
It should be noted that the CEPT decisions outlined above are recommendations and are 
therefore not binding on member  states. The 2500–2690 MHz frequency band can be 
introduced in Finland on a technology neutral basis also for other than IMT-2000/UMTS use. 
 
Usability of the frequency band 
The frequency band is harmonised Europe-wide and in a number of countries the band has 
been taken, or will be taken, within the sphere of commercialisation. In Finland the whole 
band could be taken into use in 2009, after the removal of radio link use, and regionally 
restricted use would be possible even earlier. The available 190 MHz corresponds to 475 
GSM channels or 24 UMTS channels. 
 
In Sweden, for example, it has been decided to auction the said frequency band, such that 14 
separate 2 x 5 MHz frequency segments will be awarded for FDD use (for example UMTS, 
fixed WiMax; 2500–2570 MHz and 2620–2690 MHz) and one 50 MHz frequency segment 
for TDD use (e.g. mobile WiMax; 2570–2620 MHz). In Norway, correspondingly, the plan is 
to award 11 separate frequency segments, each 10 MHz in size (2540–2620 MHz and 2660–
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2690 MHz), a total of 110 MHz, and 8 separate frequency segments 2 x 5 MHz (2500–2540 
MHz and 2620–2660 MHz), a total of 80 MHz. It is to be noted that in Norway the frequency 
band to be applied to mobile WiMax is larger than that specified in the CEPT 
recommendation (110 MHz v. 50 MHz). 
 
 
4.3 1805–1880 / 1710–1785 MHz frequency band 
 
The frequency band has available for mobile communications 2 x 75 MHz frequency band, 
corresponding to 374 channels. A guard band is needed between the GSM 1800 frequency 
band and DECT. Currently the guard band size is, as a rule, 5 MHz at the upper edge of the 
GSM 1800 band. The band has nearly 100 channels free, which corresponds, for example, to 
four UMTS channels. Of the channels which are free, 36 of them are used for research. 
 
Usability of the GSM 1800 frequency band 
It would be possible to reserve part of this frequency band for industry, research and 
education use, and also to award additional channels for mobile communications use. 
 
 
4.4 2110–2170 / 1900– 1980 MHz frequency band 
 
The amount of frequency available in this frequency band is 2 x 60 MHz. TeliaSonera, DNA 
and Elisa each have available 2 x 15 MHz (TDD) and 5 MHz (TDD) in this frequency band. 
 
Usability of the UMTS frequency band 
The frequency segment 2 x 15 MHz (FDD) and 5 MHz (TDD), liberated from the company 
Finland 3G, is immediately available in the frequency band. 
 
 
4.5 New frequency bands for public telecommunications operations possibly decided by WRC 
2007 
 
The 2007 World Radiocommunication Conference allocated frequencies from four different 
frequency segments for future mobile communications systems. 
 
In European and African countries, 72 MHz from the present TV-UHF band, i.e. the 790–862 
MHz upper band of the TV-UHF band, will be allocated to mobile network (IMT) use as of 
2015. For European and African countries, this band will be the primary mobile allocation for 
IMT, although other mobile uses have not been excluded. An absolute obligation to protect 
neighbouring countries’ primary traffic is attached to the use of 790–862 MHz, however. 
Finland must therefore protect the frequencies allocated for the use of TV stations in the 
neighbouring countries’ digital TV plan (GE-06). 
 
The frequency range between 3.4 – 3.6 GHz frequency band will be allocated as mobile 
network capacity bands. The frequency solution is regional, encompassing 80 European and 
African countries as well as Japan and Korea. Using the frequency range  for mobile networks 
(IMT) will require the protection of satellite systems currently in use in the frequency band. 
The protection obligation also requires an agreement  to be concluded with neighbouring 
countries, so that satellite use in border areas between countries will also not be restricted in 
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future. Restrictions on mobile networks in Finland required by the protection of neighbouring 
countries’ radio and satellite traffic cannot yet be estimated. The frequency band will be 
allocated to mobile traffic as of 2010. 
 
In terms of the 450–470 MHz and 2300–2400 MHz frequency bands, IMT identification  will 
come into effect immediately when the changes to the Radio Regulations enter into force on 1 
January 2009. In the Radio Regulations the primary mobile allocation was already in these 
bands before this conference. In Finland and elsewhere in Europe, these frequencies already 
had an existing other use, and the use of the frequencies will not change, at least in the near 
future, because of IMT identification in Finland and Europe. 
 
 
4.6 TV-VHF band 
 
The band has immediately available  GE-O6 frequencies for two national networks, with one 
possible use being, for example, high-definition television HDTV. Depending on compression 
technology development and the HDTV resolution used (720p/1080i/1080p), it is estimated 
that 2-4 HDTV programmes will occupy one channel bundle in 2009. For viewers, the use of 
HDTV in this band would mean the acquisition of new antennas and digital set-top boxes. 
 
 
4.7 TV-UHF band 
 
In addition to the present terrestrial digital television channel bundles and the mobile 
television channel bundle (DVB-H), Finland has available frequencies in the UHF band for 
two national television networks. Theoretically, it would be possible to allocate frequencies 
from the frequency band also for mobile traffic, namely channels 62–69. This would require 
replanning of the frequencies. Finland’s use of the said channels is restricted by radio 
navigation use in Russia. Europe-wide technical compatibility work for this frequency band is 
still incomplete. As described in Chapter 4.5 above, the WRC 2007 allocated the 790–862 
MHz frequency band to future mobile communication systems as of 2015. At the same time, 
the WRC 2007 requests ITU-R to study the compatibility of public broadcasting and new 
mobile applications, so that present and future use of public broadcasting is safeguarded. 
 
The use of DVB-H is currently restricted by the fact that DVB-H terminal devices are only 
able to access TV channels up to around 750 MHz. For example, a new national DVB-H 
network could therefore not be awarded at the present time without the replanning of 
frequencies. Regional networks could be allocated to DVB-H. In terms of DVB-H, a suitable 
compromise between quality and efficiency may be to have 30 multimedia programme 
channels per channel bundle. 
  
 
 
4.  Proposal for restricting further work 
 
In the working group’s letter of appointment, the working group was requested to prepare a 
proposal for models of awarding frequency access rights in Finland, and to identify the 
frequencies usable in possible commercialisation as well as other conditions relating to 
possible commercialisation. The working group began its work with hearings of operators in 
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the sector, after which the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority presented from a 
technical perspective the frequencies which would have the potential and/or the capacity to 
come within the sphere of possible commercialisation. 
 
The working group in its discussions has taken into account the Government Programme item 
by which frequency access would be reformed moderately in a more flexible and efficient 
direction. The working group has also taken into account the views presented in the hearings 
of operators in the sector. The working group in its discussions has decided to propose that 
further work should be focused on those frequencies that in the event of possible 
commercialisation would be free from other use, in which case the uninterrupted continuity of 
all existing services and other purposes could be guaranteed in accordance with existing 
access rights. The 2.50–2.69 GHz frequency band, which will be liberated from radio link use 
by the beginning of 2009, would be best suited as a focus for further work, in the view of the 
working group. The working group has also discussed the spectrum reforms under way in the 
European Union, particularly the spectrum recommendation (WAPECS) and the 
Commission’s proposals for amending the electronic communications directives. 
 
The working group, having taking into account the above-mentioned aspects in its 
discussions, has decided to propose that its further work be restricted in accordance with the 
following principles: 
  
a. Uninterrupted continuity is guaranteed for frequencies currently used in official and research 
activity in accordance with existing access rights  
b. Public service television and radio activity is safeguarded, as is television and radio activity 
under software licences awarded by the Government, in accordance with existing access rights  
c. Frequencies currently in mobile communications or wireless broadband use are safeguarded  
in accordance with existing access rights  
d. The Europe Commission’s spectrum recommendation (WAPECS), which will probably 
come into force in early 2008, is taken into account where applicable  
e. A full-scale access rights commercialisation process is planned for the 2.50–2.69 GHz 
frequency band (see figure), whose key principles would be  
i. promoting competition and new investments,  
ii. the right to transfer access rights and  
iii. service and technology neutrality.  
The frequency band will be liberated from the beginning of 2009 and may be 
included in the European Commission’s WAPECS recommendation as well as 
the band allocated for the ITU’s IMT framework. The various decisions and 
necessary legislative amendments have been made, the award of access rights on 
a commercial basis could take place at the earliest at the end of 2009. 
f. The working group takes no position on whether or not the models prepared by the working 
group should be taken into use. Frequency access operating licences are decided by the 
Government. 
